Information Management System

ABSTRACT

An information management system is described comprising one or more workstations running applications to allow a user of the workstation to connect to a network, such as the Internet. Each application has an analyzer, which monitors transmission data that the application is about to transmit to the network or about to receive from the network and which determines an appropriate action to take regarding that transmission data. Such actions may be extracting data from the transmission data, such as passwords and usernames, digital certificates or eCommerce transaction details for storage in a database; ensuring that the transmission data is transmitted at an encryption strength appropriate to the contents of the transmission data; determining whether a check needs to be made as to whether a digital certificate received in transmission data is in force, and determining whether a transaction about to be made by a user of one of the workstations needs third party approval before it is made. The analyzer may consult a policy data containing a policy to govern the workstations in order to make its determination. The information management system provides many advantages in the eCommerce environment to on-line trading companies, who may benefit by being able to regulate the transactions made by their staff according to their instructions in a policy data, automatically maintain records of passwords and business conducted on-line, avoid paying for unnecessary checks on the validity of digital certificates and ensure that transmissions of data made by their staff are always protected at an agreed strength of encryption.

RELATED APPLICATION

This application is a continuation of U.S. application Ser. No.09/923,704, filed Aug. 7, 2001, claiming priority to GB 0027280.7 filedNov. 8, 2000 in Great Britain, both of which are incorporated herein byreference in their entirety.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

This invention relates to the provision of extended managementfunctionality for Internet applications, particularly in the areas ofinformation security, transaction auditing and reporting, centralizedpolicy, and application connectivity.

Electronic commerce (“eCommerce”), particularly between businesses(“B2B”), but also between business and consumers (“B2C”), is a fastgrowing market where buyers and sellers communicate using the Internet,a worldwide network of linked computer systems, instead of bytraditional means such as mail, telephone and personal meetings. Sellersadvertise products and services using digital brochures and catalogues,which can be viewed or downloaded via an Internet connection, throughpages on the World Wide Web, or via electronic marketplaces typicallydealing in the goods and services of a particular market sector. Buyerscan find suppliers, select goods, obtain quotations, place and trackorders, and even make payments entirely electronically and at any time.eCommerce brings the promise of increased flexibility, choice andefficiency, with dramatically reduced procurement costs.

There are two universally accepted means of interfacing users to theInternet. The first of these is the “Web Browser” which allows users toview pages on the World Wide Web by accessing individual web sites, theaddresses of which are typically widely published either usingtraditional means, or are referenced in another web site. The mostwidely adopted web browser is Microsoft Corporation's “InternetExplorer.”

The second means of interfacing is using an Electronic Mail program,with which the user composes a message, known as an e-mail, which isthen electronically routed to the address of the intended recipient overthe Internet. Well known Electronic Mail programs include IBMCorporation's “Lotus Notes” and Microsoft Corporation's “Outlook.”

In a typical eCommerce scenario, a buyer might identify a particularproduct, together with pricing and delivery information, on the sellers'web site. He may then place an order, either by filling in an electronicorder form on the web site, or by sending an e-mail directly to theseller. The order would typically include a commitment to payment,perhaps in the form of Credit Card details, or by some electronicpayment means. The seller would then typically send a return e-mail toconfirm acceptance of the order.

Web Browsers operate in accordance with recognized standards, inparticular Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (“HTTP”), described fully inInternet standards document RFC2616. Electronic Mail programs operate inaccordance with recognized standards, in particular Simple Mail TransferProtocol (“SMTP”), described fully in Internet standards documentRFC0821 and Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (“MIME”) describedfully in Internet standards documents RFC2045-2049.

While eCommerce provides enormous benefits, its adoption raises many newissues, which must be addressed in order to ensure its continuedadoption, particularly if it is to ultimately replace traditionalmethods. One of the central issues is security.

The Internet is an open communications network, which is by definitioninsecure since anyone can use it.

Means to secure sensitive information to be exchanged over the Internet(for example in an eCommerce transaction) have been provided by theadoption of secure transmission protocols and messaging. Secure point topoint transmission protocols, used for example between a web Server anda web Browser, include the “Secure Socket Layer” (“SSL”), defined byNetscape Communications Corporation, and its successor “Transport LayerSecurity” (“TLS”) defined in Internet standards document RFC2246. Securee-mail message standards include “Secure Multipurpose Internet MailExtensions” (“S/MIME”) described fully in Internet standards documentRFC2633 and “Pretty Good Privacy” a public domain secure messagingsystem developed by Philip Zimmerman.

In order to control access to information on servers connected to theInternet, a system of usernames and passwords has been widely adopted.For example, access to discounted price lists on a particular web servermay be restricted to trade users who have previously been given ausername and password allowing them access. Similarly, on-lineinformation services typically make extensive use of usernames andpasswords to restrict access to those who have paid for the service. Byproviding each user with a unique username and a changeable password,the service can ensure that only paid subscribers can access the system,and allow users to prevent access by others to their personal datastored by the service.

In eCommerce applications, a major problem is the issue of identity andtrust. When a supplier receives an order via the Internet it isperfectly possible, even likely, that he has no prior knowledge of thecustomer. The supplier must establish that the customer is a) who hesays he is, in other words that he is not masquerading as someone else,and that b) he is to be trusted and will ultimately pay for the goods orservice to be supplied. These issues have been addressed in the B2Cmarket principally by the use of credit cards. The customer provides hiscredit card number and address with the order, which the supplier thenverifies with the credit card company, and obtains authorization for thecharge. The entire process is typically carried out on-line withouthuman intervention. This method is largely effective where a supplierships goods to the cardholder address, since a potential thief would notonly need to steal the cardholders details, but would also need tointercept delivery of the goods. It is much less effective in the caseof services where no physical delivery is involved.

Clearly, the use of credit cards in eCommerce, though widespread, isrestricted to small-scale transactions potentially involving amounts,say, up to $10,000. For those transactions above such amounts (which inaggregate monetary terms far exceed those below them), a mutuallytrusted third party must be used to establish both identity and trust.

Central to establishing identity is the use of Digital Certificates. Thecustomer can be issued with a Digital Certificate by a trusted thirdparty, which is then used to electronically “sign” communications. Onreceipt of a signed message, the recipient (in this case the supplier)can positively establish a) the identity of the sender, b) that themessage has not been altered, and c) that the sender cannot subsequentlydeny he sent the message. Recognized standards for Digital Certificatesare described in ITU document X.509, and their use in Internetcommunications in Internet standards documents RFC2312, RFC2459,RFC2510, RFC2511, RFC2527, RFC2560, RFC2585 and RFC2632.

Chargeable, Third party services, such as that provided by ValicertInc., can be used to verify that a Digital Certificate has not beenrevoked, for example after the certificate has been compromised in someway.

Once authenticity of messages is established, the supplier can useanother third party to establish trust, or the same third party can beused to establish both authenticity and trust. For example “Identrus,” aconsortium of the world's major banks, provide a system such that when asupplier receives a message signed with an Identrus issued DigitalCertificate, he can independently verify that the customer is a validaccount holder in good standing with a recognized bank.

Ultimately the system is to be extended such that the bank willadditionally warrant the transaction, thereby guaranteeing payment tothe supplier. It will be appreciated that the terms “customer” and“supplier” can apply to any two parties engaged in Internetcommunication.

It can be seen that appropriate combinations of the systems describedprovide a secure foundation for use of the Internet and the services andfunctions available through it. However, we have appreciated that thereare a number of problems with conducting eCommerce using only thesesystems. These problems are discussed below.

In the secure transmission protocols and messaging referred to above,data is usually encrypted before transmission and decrypted by theintended recipient prior to viewing. Thus, should the data beintercepted during transmission, it will be safe from viewing byunauthorized third parties unless they know or can ascertain the secretencryption key of the encryption algorithm.

The encryption and decryption of data at each end of a secure link ormessage requires significant processing power. Additionally bothtransmitting and receiving parties must be in possession of the sameencryption key of the encryption algorithm, at the same cryptographicstrength, in order for the system to operate successfully. This oftenpresents a problem, for example where regulations for the import orexport of data into or out of a computer system prohibit the use ofhigher strength algorithms, forcing the link or message to be encryptedat a lower cryptographic strength, or preventing secure communicationsat all. Consequently, secure links and messaging are typically used onlywhen necessary.

In the case of communications over the World Wide Web, the requirementto secure transmissions is determined and initiated by the web Server.If, for example, the server is about to transmit an order form forcompletion by the user it may initiate a secure link such that the orderinformation will be encrypted when transmitted back to the server.Similarly, once the order is complete the server may terminate thesecure link and return to normal unencrypted communication.

Typically, the only indication the user has that a link has been securedis an icon (usually depicting a padlock), which appears in the browserwindow. Once the icon has appeared, the user can then typicallyinterrogate the browser to determine the strength of the encryptionalgorithm being used, and can decide whether or not to enter, andsubsequently transmit sensitive information, such as his credit card andaddress details.

In practice however, users frequently do not check that the link issecure, far less that it is of suitable cryptographic strength toprotect the information being transmitted. In order to address thisproblem, e-mail applications such as Microsoft Corporation's “Outlook”provide the ability to encrypt all e-mails by default.

The wide adoption of usernames and passwords has created a managementproblem for many Internet users due to the sheer number that need to beremembered, particularly when good security practice requires passwordsto be frequently changed. Similarly, users will often need to use avariety of different usernames since someone else may already have takentheir “favourite” at a given site. Facilities to remember, and toautomatically complete username and password fields on subsequentoccasions, have been provided in web Browsers such as MicrosoftCorporation's “Internet Explorer,” and by add-on “helper” utilities suchas Gator.com's “Gator.” These facilities typically maintain a file ofusernames, passwords and the web page to which each applies. These filesare encrypted to ensure that only the appropriate user can access them.If such username and password files are lost or become unavailable, suchas when the authorized user has forgotten the encryption key or can nolonger be contacted to provide it, or when the file is accidentally ormaliciously lost, destroyed, or corrupted then access to Internetaccounts and services may be lost, and each site must be approachedindividually to replace or recover the necessary username and/orpassword. This can be a very expensive problem for corporations in termsof lost access and administrative time. Additionally, such rememberedusernames and passwords are only available for use on the machine onwhich they were originally used. If the user moves to another machine,or uses multiple machines then the stored usernames and passwords areunavailable to him from those other machines.

All businesses, and many individual users, have a legal obligation tomaintain accurate records of the transactions they undertake, but foreCommerce transactions this can prove difficult. Businesses must keeprecords for auditing purposes, for example to prove the terms upon whichgoods were ordered in the event of a dispute. Such records areconsiderably more difficult to maintain in an eCommerce environment,requiring the user to retain, for example, copies of orders sent bye-mail, or to print out the web page receipt from a web site purchase.For the user, this is labour intensive and there is no guarantee thatany such created records are complete or reliable.

One automated solution of keeping records of eCommerce transactions isprovided by Max Manager Corporation's “Max Manager” application. MaxManager captures receipt pages at known web sites, extracts transactioninformation from those receipt pages, and then stores locally both thereceipt page and the extracted transaction information on the machine onwhich the application is running. However, in order to operate, MaxManager must be supplied with the exact address and layout of thereceipt page. Max Manager determines that an eCommerce transaction hastaken place either by detecting the address of the receipt page, or bycomparing the current page being viewed by a browser with the layout ofthe receipt page that it has been supplied with. Once it has identifieda receipt page, the relevant transactions details are extracted from thereceipt page by using the known layout of the page as a template formatching purposes. A significant drawback with Max Manager is that itmay only be used to extract data from those pages for which it has beensupplied with details. Moreover, if the layout of the receipt page ischanged then Max Manager cannot meaningfully extract any data from thepage until it is supplied with a new template for the changed layout.Since web sites change frequently, Max Manager must be constantlyupdated to take account of such changes. This is impractical on a largescale and inevitably leads to transactions being missed, or worsereported incorrectly.

Problems also stem from the fact that computer terminals aredistributed, often resulting in terminals and users being located atdifferent locations. In multi-user environments, user machines may bephysically connected to each other, for example using a Local AreaNetwork (“LAN”), which provides a gateway for connection to theInternet. They may also be connected to local servers such as MicrosoftCorporation's “Exchange Server,” which acts as a central collection anddistribution point for e-mail messages, and Microsoft Corporation's“Proxy Server,” which acts both as a cache to improve performance offrequently visited web Sites, and as a filter to prevent access tocertain web Sites which may have been designated as undesirable.However, in so far as the exchange of information is concerned, exceptin the case of a message sent between two local users, each useroperates entirely in isolation from others at the same location. Thispresents a significant management problem for corporate and otherorganizations, which have no means of centrally controlling employeeactivity and cannot benefit from the significant cost savings that mightbe made from the sharing of information. For example, two users in anorganization may independently receive e-mail messages digitally signedby the same sender. Both recipients must separately validate the DigitalCertificate, incurring two validation charges, at least one of which wasunnecessary.

The present invention provides additional functionality to the systemsmentioned above to alleviate their inherent problems and to provide asingle integrated system for information exchange.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

The invention is set forth in the independent claims to which referenceshould now be made. Advantageous features of the invention are set outin the appendant claims.

The information management system provides many advantages in theeCommerce environment to on-line trading companies, who may benefit bybeing able to regulate the transactions made by their staff according totheir instructions encoded in the policy data, automatically maintainrecords of passwords and business conducted on-line, avoid paying forunnecessary checks on the validity of digital certificates, and ensurethat the transmission of data by their staff is always protected at anagreed level of encryption.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The preferred embodiment of the invention will now be described in moredetail, by way of example, and with reference to the drawings in which:

FIG. 1 is a schematic illustration of the present arrangement of systemsand resources making up the Internet according to the prior art;

FIG. 2 is schematic illustration of the preferred embodiment of theinvention implemented in a corporate environment;

FIG. 3 is a schematic illustration of the operation of a web browser inaccordance with the preferred embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 4 is an illustration of a typical input window generated by a webbrowser;

FIG. 5 is a schematic illustration of the operation of an e-mail clientin accordance with the preferred embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 6 is a flowchart illustrating the operation of a plug-in module,according to a preferred embodiment of the invention, for capturingusername and password values transmitted by a user to a remote web site;

FIG. 7 is an illustration of example policy data specifying controlconditions for recording data;

FIG. 8 is a flowchart illustrating the operation of a plug-in module,according to a preferred embodiment of the invention, for recognizingcredit card numbers contained in data transmitted to or from a webserver or e-mail client;

FIG. 9 is a flowchart illustrating the operation of a plug-in module,according to a preferred embodiment of the invention, for establishingthe validity of a digital certificate received by a user;

FIG. 10 is an illustration of example policy data for determiningwhether or not a digital certificate should be verified;

FIG. 11 is a flowchart illustrating how the example policy data shown inFIG. 10 is used to determine whether or not to verification is requiredfor a digital certificate;

FIG. 12 is a flowchart illustrating the operation of a plug-in module,according to a preferred embodiment of the invention, for identifyingtransmissions from a user or to a user that comprise part of aneCommerce transaction;

FIG. 13 is an illustration of example policy data intended to be usedwith the process illustrated in FIG. 12 to identify a transaction;

FIG. 14 is a flowchart illustrating the operation of a plug-in module,according to a preferred embodiment of the invention, for recordingtransmissions identified as comprising part of a single transactionthereby forming a record of the transaction;

FIG. 15 is a flowchart illustrating the operation of a plug-in module,according to a preferred embodiment of the invention, for approving orrejecting identified transactions on the basis of a predetermined policysetting; and

FIG. 16 is an illustration of example policy data for determiningwhether an identified transaction requires approval, and for identifyingan appropriate approver;

FIG. 17 is a flowchart illustrating the operation of a plug-in module,according to a preferred embodiment of the invention, for determining anappropriate level of encryption for a transmission and allowing thattransmission to be transmitted only if that level is provided; and

FIG. 18 is an illustration of example policy data specifying therequired encryption strength for various data types.

DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENT

The preferred system provides users of the Internet with an automaticway of managing the flow of information on a computer system. Itprovides facilities to manage the security level at which transmissionsoccur, facilities to record on-line transactions and to refertransactions that are about to be made to third parties for approval,and means to stop transactions from occurring if approval is refused; italso provides facilities to extract and record pertinent data from anytransmissions that are received or are about to be transmitted.

The preferred system provides solutions for many of the problemsencountered by eCommerce companies trading over the Internet;consequently the following exemplary discussion will be directed mostlyto the implementation and use of the system by a company of reasonablesize conducting at least some of its business over the Internet. It willbe appreciated that anyone however, including companies of any size ordescription and private individuals, who use the Internet may benefitfrom the functionality provided by the preferred system.

The functionality of the preferred system is implemented through modulesof code which are “plugged-in” to the web browser or e-mail client.These “plug-in” modules may be used to control and alter the behavior ofthe web browser or e-mail client in operation.

Many existing web browsers and e-mail clients may already be readilyintegrated with such plug-in modules. In the case of Microsoft'sInternet Explorer, the plug-in is known as a “Browser Helper,” and ismore fully described in the document “Browser Helper Objects: TheBrowser the Way You Want It” by Dino Esposito, published by MicrosoftCorporation in January 1999. In the case of Microsoft's Outlook andExchange e-mail Clients, the plug-in is known as an “Extension” and ismore fully described in the document “Microsoft Outlook and ExchangeClient Extensions” by Sharon Lloyd, published by Microsoft Corporationin March 1998. The use of the “Browser Helper Object” and “Extension”plug-ins made in the preferred system will be described in more detaillater.

The use of browser or e-mail client plug-in modules to implement thefunctionality of the preferred system has the additional advantage that,since encryption of message content is usually carried out by thebrowser or e-mail client itself, examination of transmission content, toextract password information or to determine the desired level ofencryption for example, may take place before the content has beenencrypted ready for transmission, or indeed after it has been receivedand unencrypted.

FIG. 1 shows the relationship between service providers, typicallycompanies selling goods and services over the Internet 10, and userswishing to purchase such goods or services. Users equipped with webbrowsers 22, 24 and 26, can connect via the Internet and retrieve webpage information from web servers 14 and 18. Alternately users withe-mail applications 20, 30 and 32, can send and receive e-mail messageswith abc.com and xyz.com via e-mail servers 12 and 16.

In a corporate set up, such as that which is illustrated in the bottomright hand corner of FIG. 1, web browsers 24 and 26 of a corporate userare connected to the Internet via proxy server 28. The proxy server 28is used to cache web pages and control access to web sites. Similarly,the corporation has e-mail clients 30 and 32, connected to the Internetvia e-mail server 34 which acts as a central collection point fore-mails coming into the corporation and which controls distribution ofthe e-mails to individual users. It will be appreciated that while FIG.1 describes abc.com and xyz.com as sellers, a corporation can be both abuyer and a seller, and as buyers abc.com and xyz.com would be describedas corporate users for the purpose of this description.

In the case of e-mails sent and received by personal e-mail application20, it should be noted that the mail will typically be collected anddistributed by a remote e-mail server provided by the supplier of theInternet connection service to which the personal user subscribes.

While many of the features and functions of this system provideconsiderable benefit to an individual user, the system provides themaximum advantage when operating in a multi-user environment wheretransaction information is gathered from many users. FIG. 2 shows aschematic diagram of the preferred configuration of the system in amulti-user environment. The preferred system comprises a CentralManagement server 40 connected to a database 42 and operator consoles44. The Central Management Server 40 is also connected to Back OfficeApplication Plug-ins comprising Application Interfaces 50, 52 and openApplication Program Interface 54, and to Gateway components 60, 62 and64. Gateway component 62 is shown as connected to User ApplicationPlug-ins, located on one or more user's machines, comprising InternetExplorer Plug-in 70, Netscape Navigator Plug-in 72, Microsoft OutlookPlug-in 74, and Lotus Notes Plug-in 76. These plug-ins are used providethe functionality of the preferred system in the hosting program inwhich they are integrated. Four possible hosting programs are shown,Internet Explorer, Netscape Navigator, Microsoft Outlook and LotusNotes, but any other program with the capability to connect to theInternet may also be used, providing its behavior can be modified toimplement the functionality of the preferred system.

Connection to the Internet 10 is made via the User application plug-insand their respective hosting programs.

The gateway components 70, 72 and 74 are optional but are preferred asthey enable the entire system to scale, with each gateway storing andforwarding information, thereby allowing any number of users to beconnected.

Information from the multiple application Plug-Ins 70, 72, 74 and 76 forthe different applications on multiple user machines is gathered by thecentral management server 40 and stored in an associated database 42.

The Back Office Application Plug-Ins 50, 52 and 54 allow the system tointerface with third party management applications such as orderprocessing and accountancy systems. This allows transaction informationto be automatically entered and processed by such systems.

Operator Consoles 44 are provided for administrative purposes, and inparticular for the approval of transactions. While logically depicted asdirectly attached to the central management server in FIG. 2, suchconsoles could be run on any networked machine. Where an e-mail or webbrowser plug-in determines that a particular transaction requiresapproval, a request is sent to the Central Management Server and queuedpending approval by an authorized operator.

The operation of the system is controlled by policy data, which storesthe corporation's regulations regarding security, authorization, and theactions that user's are permitted to perform, as well as operatinginformation. Preferably, the policy data is stored in a policy file onthe central Management Server for access by any of the Operator Consoles44, Back Office Application Plug-ins or User Application Plug-ins. Thesystem administrator or network supervisor may define one or morepolicies or settings of the policy file and may assign individual usersor groups of users to different policies, thus controlling a user'sability or even a workstation's ability to interact with the Internetwithout the need to set parameters and controls directly at each user'smachine. A user in the accounts department of a company for example maybe assigned to an “accounts policy”; any subsequent change to thatpolicy will then automatically result in a change in the capabilities ofall users assigned to that policy.

It is preferred that the capability to edit or set the policy data isrestricted to the network supervisor or other authorized person orpersons. This may be achieved by designating one or more supervisorworkstations in the network enabled with access to edit the policy datasuch as Operator Consoles 44.

Preferably, the policy is tree-like in structure, allowing settings tobe forced down to individual policy nodes of the tree, and globalchanges to be rapidly made, for example if the CEO wishes to cause allpurchases to require his approval if company cash flow should become aproblem. Such a policy based system greatly reduces the latency inherentin both traditional purchasing systems and in current eCommercepurchasing environments.

Each user of the network will have his or her own representation ofpolicy data. Preferably, only the branches and leaves of each user'spolicy that differ from a master network policy are stored as thisallows space in memory to be saved. Although the policy data ispreferably stored in file form on the Central Management Server, it isnot intended that storage of the policy data be restricted to file formonly. Any other representation or encoding of policy settings may beemployed within the preferred system.

The implementation of the system in a web browser or in an e-mail clientwill now be described in more detail.

Use of the Preferred System in a Web Browser

FIG. 3 shows the simplified operation of a web browser. The web browseris launched at step S100 in response to a start request from either theuser or automatically from the start-up file of the user's computer. Thestart-up file contains commands to automatically run specified programswhen the computer is booted-up. After the web browser has been startedit typically requests a “home page,” the default web page for viewing,in accordance with a pre-determined setting. This is shown at step S102.

The request is sent to the appropriate web server 90, the exact Internetaddress of which usually being determined by Domain Name Services; theweb server 90 then replies with the appropriate data defining the webpage. This process is represented respectively as steps S104 and S106which result in step S108.

The data defining the web page consists of HTML script, and otherpossible data types such as XML or ActiveX, and Javascript which encodesexecutable programs. The Browser interprets this data, displaying and/orexecuting it as appropriate at step S110.

The browser then typically waits for user input at step S112. Such inputmay include filling displayed fields, clicking on a hyper-link, orentering the URL address of a new web page. Ultimately, such actionslead to a further request being sent to the web server 90 at step S114and step S116. The request may simply be another web page address, or itmay contain additional data such as that typed in to displayed fields bythe user.

FIG. 4 shows a sample web page display, in which a GUI is presented tothe user in order to receive the users name and e-mail address. It willbe seen from reference to FIG. 4 that the user has entered his name as“Fred Smith” into the name request field provided, and his e-mailaddress as “fsmith@xyz.com” into the e-mail address field.

When the user clicks the “Submit” button provided on the request window,the details the user entered are included in the command sent to the webserver 90. Such a command might be:

-   -   http://www.sample.com/sample2.htm?UserID=Fred+Smith&email=fsmith        xyz.com&submit=submit

It can be seen from the above that the user's name is incorporated intothe command as the value of a variable called “UserID” and his e-mailaddress is incorporated as the value of a variable called “email.”

The command is assembled in step S114, and transmitted to the web server90 in step S116 where the user name and e-mail address information maybe used, for example, to send product information to the user viae-mail, or to gain access to other web pages.

The plug-in module provided by the preferred embodiment of the inventionin the form of a Browser Helper Object (BHO) provides additionalfunctionality to augment that of the standard web browser. The BHO isimplemented to respond to a number of significant events that occur asthe web browser is operated and directed by the user to interact withvarious web sites and pages.

The BHO is implemented to monitor navigation requests and data submittedto the web server from the browser and identify data that is unique tothe user. It may do this simply by searching the outbound data streamfor the presence of pre-determined words or phrases. In the above caseshown in FIG. 4, the two variable definitions “UserID” and “email” maybe searched for, and the data that follows them extracted and stored.Alternatively, the BHO may search for the “?” symbol, which indicatesthe end of the URL address being connected to and indicates that whatfollows is data. The BHO may also monitor the inbound data streamreceived from the web site being connected to.

Also, the BHO may be implemented to monitor the operation of the webbrowser itself. As the web browser operates it generates “events” tonotify co-dependent software modules or objects that somethingsignificant has just occurred or that an action has just been completed.The name of the event is usually descriptive in its own right of whathas just occurred; additional data that describes the event in moredetail is normally available. The BHO is implemented to trap theseevents and to take action in dependence on them.

One such event that the BHO is implemented to respond to is called“BeforeNavigate” which the web browser fires when the user requests thebrowser navigates to a new page. The event is issued and may berecognized by the BHO before the requested page is downloaded, allowingthe BHO to take any pertinent action before the user views the page. Onesuch action might be to record the page and any data submitted inresponse to that page in a database. Another such action might be toidentify the URL of the requested page from the event and prevent thepage being downloaded.

Another event that the BHO traps is the “DocumentComplete” event, whichis fired by the web browser when a new page has been fully downloadedfrom the web site into memory. The page is encoded in the form of aDocument Object, conforming to Microsoft's Document Object Model (DOM).The DOM provides comprehensive access to the data comprising the page,allowing the BHO to extract data items which are of interest to it. Forexample, the BHO may request data from the DOM to determine whether thepage forms part of an eCommerce transaction. It may do this by searchingobjects in the DOM for terms such as “Receipt” or “Account Number.”

The BHO may also use the DOM to determine the field names or field typesof data being requested on a web page. The data entered by the user intosuch fields may then be extracted from the DOM and stored or acted upon.Field names are typically descriptive of what is stored; passwords, forexample, are often held in a field called “password” and so may besearched for on a web page. Credit card numbers may be searched for in asimilar way. Usually, password fields are of a type such that anyentered data is displayed as asterisks. This too may be determined fromanalysis of the DOM and used to identify pertinent data.

User data would not normally be present in a web page downloaded from aweb site, but would be entered by the user into an HTML form. Usually,the potentially sensitive user data is transmitted to the web site viathe web server when the user selects a “Submit” button. At this stage,the BHO can trap the “Submit” event issued by the web browser, andaccess the DOM to extract the user data, and, if necessary, prevent thedata from being transmitted.

Encryption and decryption on a secure link will take place after point Cand before point A in FIG. 3 respectively. Thus, the BHO may analyze thedata before it is encrypted or after it is decrypted. This isadvantageous since there is no need for the BHO to perform any encodingor decoding of data itself. This does not affect the ability todetermine if the link is secure or not, since a secure link can beidentified by the protocol identifier “https” at the beginning of thecurrent URL. It is preferred that examination of the transmission'scontent take place before encryption or after decryption occurs.

Discussion of the Operation of an E-mail Client

With reference to FIG. 5 of the drawings, the operation of a typicale-mail client, and the implementation of the preferred embodiment in ane-mail client will now be described.

FIG. 5 shows the simplified operation of an e-mail client. Receive andSend operations typically operate independently, and these operationsare shown separately on opposite sides of FIG. 5, beginning at stepsS120 and steps S130 respectively.

An e-mail client's “receive message” operation is initiated at stepS120. This may be done automatically at predetermined intervals in orderto keep the user informed of any new messages that he has received, orit may be done in response to the user manually selecting a “receivemessages” icon. Starting this operation causes the e-mail client to pollthe e-mail server 95 and download any new messages to the user'smachine. In step S122, an e-mail message is received by the e-mailclient. Typically, when a new message is received, it is added to an“Inbox,” with the received message headers (senders name, date and titlefor example) arranged in a list. The user then clicks on the appropriateentry in the list to read the full message causing it to be displayed onhis computer screen. The e-mail message is displayed at step S124.

In the case of an outgoing e-mail, the user selects a “compose e-mail”option as step S130. In response, the e-mail client provides aninterface comprising a text editor in which the user can enter the textof the body of the message and other information such as destinationaddress, subject and so on. The user composes the message in step S132and then opts to send it, by selecting an icon or menu option providedby the e-mail client to issue a “send command.” The e-mail is sent tothe e-mail server for transmission to the recipient in step S134. If anyencryption is applied by the e-mail client it is applied in step S134before transmission.

In the preferred embodiment, additional functionality is provided forthe e-mail client via a plug-in module. Preferably, the e-mail client isone of those provided by Microsoft, such as the Microsoft Exchangeclient, or the Microsoft Outlook client, and the plug-in module isencoded as an Exchange client extension. These are described in thedocument “Microsoft Outlook and Exchange Client Extensions” by SharonLloyd mentioned earlier.

An Exchange Client Extension is a component object that complies withthe Microsoft Windows Component Object Model (COM) and that utilizes theExchange IExchExt interface. This interface provides a number ofadditional interfaces for modifying the operation of the Exchange e-mailclient, such as the IExchExtCommands interface, which allows existingclient behavior to be replaced or modified and new commands to be addedto the client's menus; and the IExchExtEvents interface which allowscustom behavior to be implemented to handle client “events” such as thearrival of new messages, reading, writing, sending messages and readingand writing attached files. The IExchExtMessageEvents,IExchExtSessionEvents and the IExchExtAttachmentEvents interfaces arealso provided and provide additional functionality for the more specifictasks that each of the interfaces names suggest.

In the preferred embodiment, the Exchange Client Extension that formsthe plug-in module is implemented to respond to client “events” that arefired by the client program as it performs operations and completesactions. The “events” in question are provided by the COM interfacesmentioned above. The monitoring of the e-mail client by the plug-inmodule may therefore be seen to be analogous to the way in which the BHOplug-in module monitors the operation of the web browser.

The e-mail client plug-in module is implemented to respond to the“OnDelivery” event for example which is fired when a new message isreceived from the underlying mail delivery system and before it isvisible to the user. The “OnDelivery” event contains information toaccess the different parts of the e-mail message that have beendownloaded and which are held in memory. The message header, the messagebody and any message attachments are encoded in memory as properties ofthe message object which may be separately accessed through MailApplication Program Interface (MAPI) calls.

Via the information supplied as part of the “OnDelivery” event, theplug-in module may access the message header and extract the identity ofthe sender for example. Furthermore, the plug-in module may utilizeinformation obtained from MAPI calls to scan the body of a receivedmessage for keywords or pertinent data. It may search for evidence of aneCommerce transaction, by identifying significant words such as“receipt” or “account number.” The message may then be stored forauditing purposes. In the case of an unapproved sender, or harmfulmessage content, the message may be deleted unseen.

The analysis of a received e-mail occurs therefore at point A in FIG. 5prior to being viewed by the user. Preferably the e-mail is examinedbefore the e-mail is even placed in the Inbox. Where a message is notautomatically decrypted before being placed in the Inbox, for examplewhere the user is required to enter a decryption key, the message isexamined immediately following decryption, but before viewing. DigitalCertificates may be included as attachments to the e-mail and canreadily be examined prior to viewing, allowing any appropriate actions,such as validation, to be performed.

Another significant client event that the plug-in module is implementedto respond to is the “OnWriteComplete” event which is fired when theuser has selected the “send command” and requested the e-mail client totransmit a new e-mail message to the mail delivery system. This event isfired, at point B in FIG. 5, before the transmission and before anyencryption takes place. The new message which is to be transmitted issimilarly stored in memory as an object which may be accessed by MAPIcalls. The plug-in module may use the MAPI calls to scan the content ofthe outgoing e-mail for sensitive data, such as credit card number, andconsequently cause the message to be recorded or even blocked.

Plug-In Module Operation

The preferred implementation of the web browser and e-mail clientplug-in modules has been described above with reference to FIGS. 3 and 5above. Next, the functionality provided by the plug-in modules will bedescribed in detail and with reference to FIGS. 6 to 18.

Identifying and Recording Usernames, Passwords and Other Information

The preferred system provides means to automatically identify, collectand store data contained in transmissions to and from a user'sworkstation, in particular, the usernames and passwords entered by auser to access web site pages, File Transfer Protocol (“FTP”) sites andother such sites on the Internet.

Systems that presently provide facilities to record passwords currentlyonly do so when a user a clicks on the “remember password,” optionprovided on the GUI. The password is saved into a protected local fileon the user's machine that is only opened when the user is authenticatedon that machine, for example, by entering his username and password atboot time. The remember password option causes the system to rememberthe user's password when he next visits, pre-filling in the passwordfield with that password so that the user does not have to enter it eachtime it is required. The drawback of the password file being storedlocally is that if the user moves to another machine he does not haveaccess to the stored password file and will have to re-enter thepassword himself.

The preferred system identifies passwords automatically, without theneed for instruction from the user, and stores the identified passwordsand usernames in a data repository. Preferably this is central database42. This allows the passwords of any user to be recalled regardless ofthe terminal at which the user logs on, providing the terminal hasaccess to the central database.

Any identified passwords and usernames are stored in the database alongwith the field names in which they are stored on the original web siteand the address of the Internet site to which they were transmitted toand at which they are used. Site information can be retrievedstraightforwardly as it is included in the HTTP request submitting thepassword and username information to that site, and in therepresentation of the web page held in memory.

Preferably, for the sake of security, the information stored in thedatabase is encrypted, so that only a select number of people, such asnetwork supervisors, system administrators or company directors haveaccess to it. They may access the database either through a workstationin the network, by entering a username or a password to identifythemselves, or through a supervisor workstation, such as OperateConsoles 44.

This storage of usernames and passwords along with address detailspresents a significant advantage to companies that use on-linefacilities. With existing technologies, if a user forgets hisauthenticating password preventing access to the protected file, orleaves the company without having disclosed it, the Internet servicecannot be accessed. A similar situation occurs if the protected file isdamaged, deleted or otherwise lost. Each Internet service must then beapproached in order to replace or recover the lost password, which canbe expensive both in terms of lost access and administrative time. Withthe preferred system, the password information may be recovered from thecentral database, so that access to web sites is not lost.

FIG. 6 is a flow diagram which schematically illustrates the operationof a plug-in module implemented to extract user name and passwordinformation from data to be transmitted to a web server.

In step S150, the plug-in module begins and parses the data about to betransmitted to the web server from the browser. This occurs at point “C”in the process illustrated in FIG. 3. Control then passes to step S152where the plug-in module determines whether or not the data which is tobe transmitted contains username or password information.

The passwords and usernames may be identified in the manner describedabove with reference to FIGS. 3, 4 and 5, by identifying field names insubmitted command or by using the DOM, for example, to search for fieldnames, field types, or the display method used to identify the data onweb pages. They may also be retrieved from the HTML of web pages, thepop-up windows or GUIs (Graphical User Interfaces) presented by remoteservers or providers on the World Wide Web or even by scanning thecontent of e-mail messages.

Identifying passwords and usernames in transmitted commands or in theDOM of a web page from their field names relies on those field namesdescribing their purpose with obvious labels such as “password” or“username.” In cases when the field names are not themselves meaningful,the nature of data being transmitted, may be inferred from the fieldtype of the data, that is “String,” “Integer” and so on, or the displaymethod used to enter the data. Fields that are intended to receive apassword can be identified from the representation in by searching for a“password” field type in the DOM. Text boxes on a web page into whichpassword data is to be entered, for example, typically display eachcharacter input as an asterisk; this property may be determined from theDOM and used to infer that data input into the text box is a passwordeven if there are no other indications. Although, the password isdisplayed as a string of asterisks, the representation in memory stillcontains the character information that was entered by the user. Thepassword may then be retrieved simply by extracting the input from thefield.

Alternatively, passwords and usernames may be identified by referring tothose stored by other programs such as Microsoft's “Internet Explorer”when the remember password option is selected by the user. Suchpasswords are stored in a local protected file on the user's computer.This file is “unlocked” when the user is authenticated on the computer,and so may be accessed to obtain password and username information bythe browser plug-in module of the preferred system.

If the plug-in module does not detect a username or a password in thedata which is to be transmitted, control passes to step S158 at whichpoint the module exits and control is passed back to point “C” in FIG.3. The browser may then transmit the data to the web server. If however,a username or a password is detected by the plug-in module at step S152then control passes to step S154, where the values of the identifiedusername or password and the URL or other identifier of the web page towhich the data is to be transmitted are extracted. Control then passesto step S156 where, these values and the URL or other identifier arestored in a predetermined system database 42. Once storage has takenplace, control then passes to step S158, where the module exits andcontrol is passed back to point “C” in FIG. 3. The browser may thentransmit the data to the web server.

The preferred embodiment need not be limited only to the storage ofpasswords or usernames which have been used as an example because of theimmediate advantage that their storage provides. Other types of data, inparticular those relating to eCommerce transactions, such as credit cardinformation and digital certificate may also be usefully extracted andstored to provide a database or record. The system for extractinginformation from transmissions may also be applied to e-mail systems.

The information may be extracted in the manner described above, via theDOM or via MAPI calls to the COM representation of e-mail content, ormay be extracted from the language in which a web page is encoded. Webpages are typically encoded in Hyper-Text Mark-Up Language (HTML), ahuman readable text based language which may be searched for known keywords or indicators using conventional text matching techniques. In thepreferred embodiment, recording of the data may involve recording justpassword and username information, recording the URL of a web page beingviewed or of an e-mail account, recording any data submitted to thefields of a web page, and recording the HTML of a web page, so that theweb page may be retrieved later and viewed.

The plug-in modules provided by the preferred system operate inconjunction with policy data, which may be recorded in a file, database,or software code for example. The policy data provides a user of thepreferred system to instruct the operation of each of the plug-inmodules thereby controlling their functionality.

A sample representation of policy data, illustrated in FIG. 7, shows howa user may control the operation of the plug-in module to recordpassword and username information along with other types of data.

The tree-like structure of the policy data is clearly seen in FIG. 7which shows just one major branch of the policy data entitled“Recording.” The Recording branch is separated into two sub-branchescalled “Browser” and “Email” which contain instructions for theoperation of web browser and e-mail client plug-in modules respectively.

The browser branch contains three sub-branches called “DataToRecord,”“When ToStartRecording” and “When ToStopRecording.” The DataToRecordbranch specifies the type of data that is to be extracted fromtransmissions to or from the user's workstation and a web server. Fourtypes of data are referred to in the illustration, these being the URLof the web page being viewed, the HTML of the web page being viewed,data that is entered by a user into fields provided on the web page andsubmitted to a web site, and any passwords and usernames that areentered by the user. These are referred to on four distinct sub-branchesof the DataToRecord branch, entitled “URL,” “HTML,” “SubmittedFields”and “Passwords.” A Yes/No option on each of those sub-branches specifieswhether or not the indicated data is to be recorded.

The When ToStartRecording branch sets out a number of conditions whichspecify the point at which the data specified in the DataToRecord branchis to be recorded. Five conditions are illustrated in this example eachone set out on a separate branch and respectively entitled “WhenBrowserIsOpened,” “IfCreditCardNumberSubmitted,” “IfPasswordSubmitted,”“IfKeywordsReceived” and “IfKeywordsSent.” Whether or not theseconditions are to be used in order to determine when to start recordingis indicated by Yes/No markers on each branch.

Similarly, the When ToStopRecording branch lists three conditions thatmay be used to determine the point at which the recording of the dataspecified in the DataToRecord branch is to be stopped. These conditionsare “When UserClosesBrowser,” “When UserChangesSite” and “WhenUserChangesPage.” The Yes/No status of each of the conditions and foreach of the type of data to be recorded may be easily set by a user ofthe preferred system in order to control the operation of the plug-inmodule.

The e-mail branch of the policy data is divided into a DataToRecordbranch and a WhenToRecord branch. Each of these branches are sub-dividedinto branches that deal with Sent Mail and Received Mail. The type ofdata that may be recorded is set out in the DataToRecord branch and forsent mail may be the message text, any attachments to the message, andin the case of messages signed with a digital signature, a copy of thedigital certificate accompanying the signature. Conditions for recordingsent mail and received mail are set out in the WhenToRecord branch andmay be based on the identification of a credit card number, a keyword ora digital certificate in the mail that is sent or received.

The tree-like structure described is the preferred form for the policydata since it allows the data to be easily organized and referred to. Italso allows different users to be assigned to different branches of thetree in order to receive different policies. Although, the tree likestructure is preferred, other arrangements may also be possible. Thebranches shown in this diagram are only intended to be illustrative.

Identification of Credit Card Numbers

The preferred system also searches for Credit Card numbers or otheraccount information in the data to be transmitted to the web server ore-mail client by searching for a string of numeric digits, typicallybetween 14 and 16 long. It then determines if the string of digitspasses one of the tests universally used by credit card companies tovalidate card numbers. If a credit card number is found in thetransmission, then the preferred system may take a number of actionsdepending on the settings in the policy file, such as refer thetransmission to a third party for approval, renegotiate a higher levelof encryption to safe-guard the transmission if the credit card numberbelongs to the company, or prevent the transmission from taking placealtogether.

The most common test to identify a credit card number is defined in ANSIstandard X4.13, and is commonly known as LUHN or Mod 10.

The Luhn formula is applied to credit card numbers in order to generatea check digit, and thus may also be used to validate credit cards, inwhich case the check digit is figured in as part of the formula. Tovalidate a credit card number using the Luhn formula, the value of everysecond digit after the first, starting from the right hand side of thenumber and moving leftwards, is multiplied by two; all of the digits,both those that have been multiplied by two and those that have not arethen added together; any digit values that have become greater than orequal to ten as a result of being doubled, are summed as if they weretwo single digit values, eg: “10” counts as “1+0=1,” “18” counts as“1+8=9.” If the total of the sum is divisible by ten, then the creditcard is a valid credit card number.

FIG. 8 is a flow diagram which illustrates the operation of a plug-inmodule which detects credit card numbers, using the Luhn formuladescribed above, in data which is about to be transmitted. If a creditcard number is identified, the plug-in module implements furtherpolicy-based checks, based on the outcome of which, the plug-in modulemay determine to transmit the data containing the credit card number orto prevent transmission.

The module begins operation at step S160, which follows point “C” in theprocess illustrated in FIG. 3 in the case of browser implementation, orpoint B in the process illustrated in FIG. 5 in the case of an e-mailclient implementation. Control passes from step S160 to step S162 inwhich the module scans the data about to be transmitted to the webserver or e-mail service and extracts from it a first string of digitsthat is likely to be a credit card number.

This is achieved by scanning the data comprising the transmission forstrings of digits over a particular number of digits long. Credit cardnumbers are usually made up of more than 12 digits, and are not usuallymore than 16 digits long. Thus any strings of digits in this range maybe identified as possible credit card numbers.

Following the extraction step S162 control passes to decision step S164where a routine end of file check is made. If the data contains nocandidate credit card number and the end of the file check is reachedbefore any first candidate number could be found, then at step S164control passes to step S178 where the transmission of the data isallowed to proceed without any further checks being made. The modulethen exits at step S180. Control resumes in the web browser operationshown in FIG. 3 from point “C” or in the e-mail client operation shownin FIG. 5 from point B.

If a first potential credit card number is found in the data in stepS162, then it is extracted and stored in memory. The end of file has notbeen reached yet so control passes from step S162 to step S164 and thento S166 where a checksum for the stored candidate number is calculatedusing the Luhn formula. Control then passes to decision step S168, wherethe checksum is queried.

If the checksum indicates that the candidate number is not a validcredit card number then control passes back to step S162 where the nextpotential credit card number is extracted from the data. If a secondcredit card number is not found, then the end of the file is reached andcontrol passes to step S178 where the transmission is allowed toproceed, and then to step S180 where the module exits.

However, if the checksum indicates that the candidate number is a validcredit card number then control passes to decision step S170 where thesettings of the policy data are queried for the appropriate action totake. The action may be determined from such factors such as the numberitself, the identity of the user transmitting the number and the addressto which it is to be sent. The policy data might for example specifythat credit cards are not to be transmitted, or that a higher encryptionstrength is required for the transmission before it may proceed.

This policy checking step allows credit card transactions to becontrolled at a higher level than the user making the transaction. Thusfinancial decisions may be swiftly and easily implemented, and may beenforced automatically without the need for monitoring. An organizationmay, for example, wish to restrict the capability to make credit cardtransactions on the organization's account to particular authorizedpeople or it may wish to restrict transactions on a particular accountaltogether.

In step S170, the credit card number, and other details of thetransaction are compared to the settings in the policy file and it isdetermined whether or not transmission may take place. If for anyreason, with reference to the policy checks, it is determined that thecredit card number should not be transmitted, control passes to stepS172 where transmission of the data is halted, and then to step S174where the module exits. At this point the system could notify the userthat the request has been denied by means of a pop-up message box.Control then returns to point A in FIG. 3, in the case of a web browser,or to step S132, “compose mail” in FIG. 5, in the case of an e-mailclient.

If in step S172, it is determined that the credit card number may betransmitted, control passes to step S176 where transmission of the dataoccurs, and then to step S1180 where the module exits. In this casecontrol is resumed from point C in the web browser operation illustratedin FIG. 3, or from point B in the e-mail client operation illustrated inFIG. 5.

Credit card numbers need not be identified in step S162 solely byscanning the content of the transmission. In web browser implementationsthe credit card number may for example be directly identified byreferring to the field names of any variables that are to be transmittedor also from the representation of the web page in memory. Thediscussion above about the identification of passwords explains this inmore detail.

The preferred system may also be configured to search outgoingtransmissions for other pertinent financial details, such as accountnumbers. Company account numbers from which funds may be deposited maybe stored in a separate file. Any likely strings of characters or digitsmay then be extracted from the outgoing data in the manner described andcompared with the entries in the accounts file to determine whether ornot it is a valid account number. The transaction may then be allowed toproceed or be refused in the manner described above. Although creditcard numbers have been referred to, it will be appreciated that any typeof card number for making payment such as debit card numbers may also beused.

Also, although identification of credit card numbers has been explainedwith reference to data that is to be transmitted, it will be appreciatedthat similar techniques could be used to identify and extract creditcard numbers from transmissions that are being received.

Validation and Authentication Support

On-line transactions typically require some form of authentication thatthe user is who he says he is, and that he is able to pay for the goodsordered. These requirements are usually met by the purchaser supplyingthe trader with his credit card number and the cardholder address whichcan then be verified by the seller with the card issuer. Increasinglyhowever, Digital Certificates are attached to electronic transmissionsby the user which, in conjunction with a digital signature, allow thereceiver to verify that the transmission originated from the personnamed as sender. Digital certificates from certain issuing authorities,such as Identrus, may also act as a warranty that the holder will honourhis commitment to pay a specified amount of money. These certificatesare useful when trading on-line.

Digital signatures are a widely used means of establishing anindividual's identity on-line when transmitting information or whenconducting a transaction. They also provide a guarantee to a recipientof any transmitted information or transaction details that those detailsand that information have not been tampered with en-route by anunauthorized third party.

Digital certificates are issued to individuals, organizations, orcompanies by independent Certificate Authorities, such as Verisign Inc.An organization may also act as its own Certificate Authority issuingits own digital certificates which may or may not be derived from a“root” certificate issued by another Certificate Authority. A digitalcertificate typically contains the holder's name, a serial number, anexpiration date, a copy of the certificate holder's public key and thedigital signature of the certificate issuing authority. A private key isalso issued to the certificate holder who should not disclose it toanyone else.

Certificates are unique to each holder and may be revoked by an issuerif the holder is no longer viable; alternatively, a holder may ask tohave it revoked if his private key has been compromised.

The public and private keys may both be used in tandem to encrypt ordecrypt a message. Anyone may use a certificate holder's public key toencrypt a message so that it may only be read by the certificate holderafter decrypting the message with his private key.

Messages may also be digitally signed using software which converts thecontents of the message into a mathematical summary, called a hash. Thehash is then encrypted using the sender's private key. The encryptedhash may then be used as a digital signature for the message that isbeing transmitted. The original message, the digital signature and thetransmitter's digital certificate are all sent to a recipient who, inorder to confirm that the message he has received is complete andunaltered from its original form, may then produce a hash for thereceived message. If, the received hash, having been decrypted with theholder's public key, matches the hash produced by the recipient, thenthe recipient may trust that the message has been sent by the person towhom the certificate was issued, and that the message has not beenaltered en route from its original form. Digital certificates aretherefore of considerable and increasing importance to companiesconducting business on the Internet.

In cases where an on-line trader makes use of Digital Certificates toensure the identity of its customers, it is necessary to check with theissuer that the certificate is still valid before any transaction isauthorized. Such checks can be carried out on-line using an independentverification service such as that provided by Valicert, Inc. A fee isusually charged for such services.

It may be that individual employees of an organization each receivee-mails from a single client, each signed with his digital certificate,on separate occasions. Presently, there is no way for a informationabout certificates received by one employee to be shared with anotheremployee unless they share it themselves manually, and as a result,individual employees might request that the same certificate bevalidated each time that they receive it. This is wasteful however,since once a certificate is revoked by its issuer, it is never againreinstated, so any validation fees spent on an already revokedcertificate are unnecessary. Additionally, the recipient may wish tomake a business judgment as to whether a previously validatedcertificate should be re-checked or not. For example, if a digitallysigned order for $1M worth of goods is received one day, and thecertificate successfully validated, and on the next day another orderfor $50 is received, signed with the same certificate, the organizationmay consider a second validation check to be unnecessary, thereby savingthe validation charge.

The preferred system provides means to record information about theDigital Certificates that have been received, the status of thecertificate at the last check as well as, where applicable, transactioninformation, such as client, amount, date, goods and so on. Thisinformation is stored in a central database to which all users of thesystem have access. The preferred system also provides means to use thestored information to decide whether or not a validation check isdesirable, and to accept or refuse transmissions depending on the statusof the digital certificate. Thus, users of the system may receive andreview transmissions without the need to establish their authenticitythemselves.

FIG. 9 illustrates the operation of a plug-in module of the preferredsystem implemented to extract digital certificates from transmissionsreceived by company employees and record them in a database along withtheir validity status and details of any associated transactions such asdate, amount, goods and so on. The module first checks to determine ifthe certificate is obviously invalid, and that the message has beencorrectly signed by it. The certificate is obviously invalid, forexample, if its expiry date has passed, or if it contains an invalid“thumbprint.” Such a thumbprint may be a checksum for the certificateitself for example. The message has not been correctly signed if thesignature cannot be verified from the information contained within thecertificate. Details of certificate validation and message signing aremore fully described in the ITU and RFC documents previously referenced.The module then makes a check to determine whether or not thecertificate has already been stored in the database and only recordsthose that have not. Where a copy of the certificate is already stored,the module checks the database record to determine whether it has beenpreviously identified as revoked in which case the transmission isimmediately rejected. Otherwise, the module then determines, inaccordance with policy defining business rules, whether or not tovalidate the certificate. Taking in to account the results of any suchvalidation, it then determines whether the certificate should be reliedupon, and therefore whether or not the transmission signed by thedigital certificate should be rejected or accepted. The module isinitiated at step S190, following receipt of data containing a digitalcertificate. Digital certificates are typically transmitted asattachments to messages and may be identified by examining the first fewbytes in the header of the attachment. These bytes identify the type offile attached and so will indicate whether an attachment is a digitalcertificate or not.

The initialisation step S190 occurs after point A in FIG. 3 if themodule is implemented in a web browser, and after point A in FIG. 5 ifthe module is implemented in an e-mail client. Following initialisation,the module proceeds to step S191 in which the expiry date of thecertificate is checked, and the digital signature confirmed as havingsigned the message. If the certificate has expired, or the message isincorrectly signed, the module proceeds to step S198 and rejects thetransmission. Otherwise the module proceeds to step S192 in which thedatabase is searched for a previously received copy of the digitalcertificate. Control then passes to decision step S194. If a copy of thecertificate has been found in the database then control passes todecision step S196 where the module determines whether the certificatehas previously been marked as revoked. This will have occurred if aprevious validity check revealed that a digital certificate has beenrevoked. If the certificate is not already in the database controlpasses from step S194 to step S202 where the new certificate and thedate on which it was received are stored in the database, together withadditional details such as the address from which it was sent anddetails of any transaction associated with the transmission such asmonetary value, account number etc. If the certificate has already beenmarked as revoked in step S196 then control passes directly to step S198in which the transmission comprising the digital certificate isautomatically rejected. This may involve for example, transmitting anautomatically generated message to the initiator of the transmissionwhose certificate has been found invalid to explain the refusal, andpreventing the recipient of the digital certificate from taking anyfurther steps in connection with the refused transmission. The modulethen exits at step S200.

If, however, the certificate has not been previously marked as revokedin step S196, then control passes to step S204 in which the history oftransmissions signed by the certificate, by other certificates from thesame company, or used to conduct transactions on the same account areconsidered with policy data to determine if an on-line validity check ofthe certificate is required. Control also passes to step S204 after anew digital certificate has been added to the database in step S202.

The policy data contains instructions which when considered inconjunction with the history of signed transmissions previously receivedand revocation checks previously made indicate whether or not thecertificate used to sign a transmission should be verified on thisoccasion. Example policy data is illustrated in FIG. 10 to whichreference should now be made.

The policy data is stored on the AcceptanceConfidenceRating branch onthe DigitalCertificates branch of the policy data representation. TheAcceptanceConfidenceRating branch sub-divides into two separate brancheswhich deal individually with “monetary” digital certificates, where acertificate has been used to sign a transmission involving a transactionwith the recipient for an amount of money, and “identity” digitalcertificates which do not involve a monetary transaction with therecipient of the transmission. Certain certificates are issued only foruse in conjunction with monetary transactions. For example, the“warranty certificate” issued by some on-line banking organizations,such as Identrus, as a warranty to the receiver of the signedtransmission. Such warranty certificates testify that the sender of thetransmission is a customer of an Identrus member bank, and that if he orshe does not make payment, the bank will accept liability.

Organizations which issue different kinds or classes of digitalcertificate mark each certificate according to its class. Identifying acertificate as being of a particular class is then a matter of knowinghow different organizations classify their certificates and searchingfor the appropriate indicator in the certificate received.

Issuers of digital certificates may provide many different classes ofcertificate suited for different purposes. These may be separately dealtwith by the policy data by corresponding sub-branches of the policydatatree.

In the example policy the first branch entitled “IdentityCertificates”deals with transmissions that do not involve a monetary transaction. Thebranch comprises four separate sub-branches. The first of these,entitled “AlwaysAcceptFrom” contains a reference to a table, “table a,”which lists the names of individuals and organizations who areconsidered to be reliable. The names listed in this table will be thoseknown and implicitly trusted by the company, for whom, it is notconsidered necessary to determine whether or not a digital certificatehas been revoked by its issuer.

The second branch entitled “AlwaysCheckFrom” contains a reference to aseparate table, table b, in which the names of organizations andindividuals for whom digital certificates should always be checked arestored. Clearly, the contents of table a and table b will depend uponthe experience of the user of the preferred system and will be left upto that user to enter.

The third branch entitled “CheckIfDaysSinceCertificateReceivedFromCompany” specifies a period of time following the receipt of a validdigital certificate from a company, within which checks of any furtherdigital certificates received from that company are not considerednecessary. In this case, the period of time is set to be 10 days.

The fourth branch entitled “CheckIfDaysSinceLastReceivedThisCertificate” specifies a similar time period in the case of anindividual digital certificate. In the example shown the policy dataspecifies that validation checks on any given digital certificate needonly be made every 30 days. Again, the number of days specified on bothof these branches is left to the user of the preferred system to decide.The amount of time that has passed since a valid digital certificate hasbeen received may be determined by referring to digital certificates andassociated data stored in the database. By checking digital certificatesperiodically, rather than each time they are received allows money spenton making checks to be saved. The MonetaryCertificates branch alsocontains an AlwaysAcceptFrom and an AlwaysCheckFrom branch which referto tables x and y respectively. Table x lists all those organizationsand individuals for whom no status check of a digital certificate isrequired; table y lists all those for whom a check is always required.The MonetaryCertificate branch also contains a CheckIfAmountExceedsbranch which specifies a threshold transaction amount over which alldigital certificates must be checked and lastly an IfRecentlyCheckedbranch which sets out two conditions for performing checks on a digitalcertificate that has been recently received and validated. TheIfRecentlyChecked branch allows the user to specify that digitalcertificates received for transactions for a small amount, in this case$5000, received within a specified time, in this case 30 days, of aprevious revocation check, need not be validated.

FIG. 11 illustrates the plug-in module process which interacts with thepolicy data shown in FIG. 9. This process is a sub-process of that shownin FIG. 8 and occurs at step S204 resulting in decision step S206 inwhich the plug-in module determines whether or not to perform an on-linecheck of the status of the Digital Certificate it has received. Thesub-process begins in step S220 from which control passes to decisionstep S222 in which it is determined if the transmission is monetary fromthe class of the Digital Certificate used to sign the message. If thetransmission is monetary then control flows to decision step S232, whichis the first in a chain of decision steps corresponding to the branchesin the MonetaryCertificates branch of the AcceptanceConfidenceRatingbranch of the policy data.

If in step S222, it is determined that the transmission is not monetary,control passes to decision step S224, which is the first decision stepin a chain of decision steps corresponding to the IdentityCertificatesbranches of the AcceptanceConfidenceRating branch of the policy data. Ineach of the decision steps in the chain a simple check is made to seewhether the conditions specified on each sub-branch of theIdentityCertificates branch of the policy data is satisfied. Dependingupon the results of that check control flows either to step S242 inwhich confidence in the Digital Certificate is established and noon-line check of the Digital Certificate's status is deemed necessary,or step S244 in which confidence is not established and an on-line checkis deemed necessary, or to the next decision step in the chain.

Thus, in decision step S224, in which it is determined whether thesender of the Digital Certificate is listed in table a, that is the“AlwaysAcceptFrom” table, if the sender of the Digital Certificate islisted in Table A then control flows from decision step S224 to stepS242 where confidence is established in the Certificate and thesub-process ends returning to step S208 in FIG. 8. If the sender is notlisted in table a then control flows from step S224 to the next decisionstep in the chain step S226 in which it is determined whether the senderof the Digital Certificate is listed in table b, that is the“AlwaysCheckFrom” table. Similarly, if the sender is listed in thistable control flows to step S244 at which an on-line check of theDigital Certificate's status is deemed necessary. Control returns fromstep S244 in the sub-process to step S210 in FIG. 8.

If the sender of the Digital Certificate is not listed in table b thencontrol flows from decision step S226 to the next decision step in thechain which represents the next condition listed as a sub-branch listedin the policy data. Thus, in decision step S228 a check is made as towhether this Digital Certificate has been validated in the last 30 days.This will involve looking up the Digital Certificate in the database ofstored Digital Certificates and extracting from the stored informationthe date on which the Digital Certificate was last checked. If thestatus of the Digital Certificate has been checked in the last 30 days,control flows to step S242 where confidence is established. If theinformation in the database of stored Digital Certificates indicatesthat the Digital Certificate has not been checked in the last 30 daysthen control flows from step S228 to decision step S230 in which a checkis made to see if another Digital Certificate has been received from thesame company and if that Digital Certificate has been checked within thelast 10 days. This determination again involves checking the database ofstored Digital Certificates and information relating to those DigitalCertificates. If the other Digital Certificate has been checked in thelast 10 days then control flows to step S242 where confidence in thereceived Digital Certificate is established. If not, then control flowsto step S244.

In the case of a monetary transmission, the conditions set out on thepolicy data are stepped through in decision steps S232 to decision stepS240. If in decision step S232 the sender of the Digital Certificate isfound to be listed in table x, which sets out the names of companies andorganizations for which no check of the Digital Certificate status isdeemed necessary, then confidence is established and control passes tostep S242. Otherwise control passes to the next decision step in thechain which is decision step S234. At decision step S234 if the senderof the Digital Certificate is founded listed in table b, that is the“AlwaysCheckFrom” Table, then confidence is not established and controlpasses to S244. Otherwise, control passes to decision step S236, whereit is determined whether the amount for which the transaction is beingmade exceeds $10,000. This determination is made with reference to thesigned transaction data which will contain the monetary amount either ina manner pre-determined by the issuer of the certificate, or containedwithin the e-mail or associated e-mails forming the transaction ortransmissions. If the transaction is found to be for an amount to be inexcess of $10,000, or if the amount of the transaction cannot bedetermined with a reference to the data transmitted, then confidence isnot established and control passes to step S244. Otherwise, controlpasses to decision step S238 in which it is determined whether theDigital Certificate has been checked within the last 30 days. Again,this determination is made with reference to the database of storedDigital Certificates and data relating to Digital Certificates. If thecertificate has not been checked within the last 30 days then confidenceis not established and control passes to step S244. If it has beenchecked, then control passes to decision step S240 where, if thepreviously determined amount of the transaction is deemed to be over$5,000 then confidence is not established and control passes to stepS244. If the amount of the transaction is under $5,000 then it isclassed as an acceptable risk to rely on the Digital Certificate,confidence is established and control passes to step S242.

These last two conditions allow the system to determine whether to checkthe certificate's status based on recent trading history. If forexample, a transaction is about to be made by a party for a modest sum,i.e. under $5000, and the search of the recorded transaction andcertificate details reveals that quite recently, the same party made atransaction and at that time their digital certificate was confirmed asbeing valid, then it is arguable that checking the validity of theparty's certificate again so soon after the first is unnecessary, and itis preferable to trust in the party rather than paying the validationfee a second time.

It will be appreciated that the instructions in the policy file may beset out to reflect the level of confidence the company has in itscustomers or suppliers, based on the experience of individuals withinthe company, the amounts of transactions that are deemed allowablewithout significant risk and so on. The policy file may also be set upto implement more general policies which are to be used in conjunctionwith a record of transaction details for the holder of that digitalcertificate. For example, any transaction that is offered by the holdermay be compared against the record of those that he has made before tosee if the amount and the goods and services requested are in keepingwith his trading history. If they are not, then it may be desirable tocheck the validity of the certificate to confirm that it is still validand guarantees the identity of the sender. If it has been revoked, thena third party may have acquired the original holder's private key and beattempting to make fraudulent transactions.

Having checked the policy data in step S204, confidence in the digitalcertificate will either have been established or will not have beenestablished. In decision step S206, if confidence has been establishedthen control passes to step S208 in which the transmission containingthe transaction is accepted. Control then passes to step S200 where themodule exits and control passes back to point A in FIG. 3 in the case ofa web browser, or point A in FIG. 5 in the case of an e-mail client.

If in step S206 confidence in the digital certificate is notestablished, then control passes to step S210, where an on-linevalidation check is performed on the digital certificate. This mayinvolve checking to see whether the Digital Certificate has been revokedor whether, in the case of an eCommerce transaction, the issuer of theDigital Certificate will confirm a warranty for the amount promised inthe transaction. Control next passes to step S212, in which the validitystatus stored in the database for that certificate is up-dated. Controlthen passes to decision step S214 in which, if the certificate was foundinvalid, control passes to step S198 where the transmission is rejected,or to step S208 where the transmission is accepted. Rejection of thetransmission may mean that it is deleted from the recipients mail boxbefore it has been opened, or that the transmission is marked with theword “rejected” or some other indicator. Following either of steps S1198or S208, control passes to step S200 where the module exits. Whenever atransaction is allowed to proceed the database is updated such that itincludes information about the transaction, such as date and amount, inorder that the information may be used in determining the need forfuture validation checks.

Recording of Information.

The preferred system also provides an automatic way in which to recordtransaction information for transactions carried out on-line. In thiscontext, the word “transaction” and “eCommerce transaction” are intendedto mean an agreement promising money or money's worth made between twoparties over the Internet, or even over the same network of a company.Normally, the user himself is responsible for maintaining transactioninformation by making hard copies of the relevant electronic records orby actively storing copies of any electronic records in files on hiscomputer. The reliance on manual methods to ensure these records aremaintained is clearly both unreliable and labor intensive.

The preferred system on the other hand scans the information content ofall communications processed by the system for indications that atransaction has begun or is taking place. Such indications are numerous.The most straightforward is whether the link is secure or not as mostweb pages negotiate a secure link before a transaction is carried outand close that link afterwards. Determining whether a link is secure isachieved by examining the URL of the destination web page. A secure linkis indicated by an “s” after the prefix “http.” Thus, one mode ofoperation of the preferred system is to record all data transmitted to aweb page while a link is secure. The preferred system also maintains arecord of web pages that negotiate secure links but that are noteCommerce sites, i.e. those that are connected to other than to makepurchases, and not record any data transmitted to these pages. Such aweb page might be Microsoft's Hotmail web page which provides an e-mailservice.

Another indication might be simply the URL of the site. In this case thepreferred system may be configured to record all data transmitted to aweb page which has been identified as that of an on-line tradingcompany. Other indications might be an identified credit card number, anelectronic receipt, an e-mail acknowledging the sale, use of a digitalcertificate, in particular a digital warranty certificate, or a purchasecode.

Once a transaction has been identified as occurring, the preferredsystem may record the details of the transaction by both storing inentirety each communication between a user and the identified trader, orby scanning the transmissions and extracting particular details, such asdate, amount, type of goods, quantity and so on.

Recording of transaction data may be stopped when the end of thetransaction is identified or after a predefined number of transmissionsbetween the purchaser and the trader have taken place. Similarly, once atransaction has been identified, the preferred system may record in thedatabase a predefined number of cached transmissions that took placeimmediately before the first recognized transmission of the transaction.

This will be useful when, for example, the first indication that atransmission is occurring is the detection of a credit card number or anelectronic receipt, since these are likely to received at the very endof a transaction. The prior transmissions may, for example consist ofweb pages containing information regarding the goods or services beingpurchased, or an exchange of e-mails where specification or deliveryterms were agreed. Note that it is perfectly possible for the priortransmissions to be of the same type as that in which the transactionwas detected, of a different type, or be a mixture of types. For examplea user might visit a web site www.abc.com, obtain details of goods, andthen order them in an email sent to orders@abc.com.

The preferred system records the transaction details in a centralizedcommon database 42. Additionally, the database may be a local file or aservice on a network. The information stored in the database may beencrypted using known encryption techniques so that only a person withthe necessary authorization may access it.

FIG. 12 is an illustration of the operation of an example implementationof a module for identifying when an electronic transaction is beingconducted on-line. FIG. 14 illustrates the process by which thepreferred system records an identified transaction in the database, andFIG. 15 illustrates how the preferred system allows an identifiedtransaction to be approved or rejected on the basis of a predeterminedapprovals policy.

With reference to FIG. 12, the operation of a module for identifyingwhen an on-line transaction is occurring will next be described.

The module begins operation at step S250 in response to receiving dataor in response to a user initiating transmission of data to a remotesite. In the case of a web browser implementation this will be afterpoint A or after point C respectively as shown in FIG. 3; in the case ofimplementation in an e-mail client it will be after point A or Brespectively as shown in FIG. 5.

Control then passes to decision step S252 in which it is determinedwhether, in the case of a web browser, a secure link has been negotiatedbetween the site transmitting data and the site receiving data. This maybe achieved by querying the URL address that has been connected to, asmentioned above, or interrogating the web browser to see if encryptionis being employed. In the case of an e-mail message this step is omittedand control passes directly to step S260. Since on-line web browsertransactions usually involve the transmission of personal information,such name and address, credit card number or other account identifyinginformation, secure links are usually negotiated as a matter of course.Thus the presence of a secure link alone is a good indication that atransaction is taking place. However, secure connections may benegotiated for reasons other than the transmission of transactiondetails. Thus, if in step S252 it is determined that the connection issecure, control passes to step S254, in which the address of the remotesite to which the connection has been made is checked against a list ofknown sites which do not provide facilities for conducting on-linetransactions but which do establish secure connections. Browser basede-mail sites such as Microsoft's Hotmail site is one such example.Control then passes to decision step S256 where a determination based onthe previous check is made. If the site address is identified as a noneCommerce site, that is one which does not facilitate the making of atransaction, then it is determined that a transaction may or may not beoccurring and control passes to decision step S260 to make furtherchecks on the transmission content. If in step S256 the site address isnot identified as a known non eCommerce site, then it is assumed that anon-line transaction is occurring, and the module exits at step S258.

If a secure connection is found not to have been established at stepS252, or if a secure connection has been established but to a knownnon-eCommerce site, as determined at step S256, or the transmission isan e-mail, then control passes to decision step S260. In decision stepS260, the first of a number of checks on the content of the transmissionare made in order to determine whether or not it is part of atransaction. In step S260, the transmission is scanned to see if itcontains a credit card number. The method for doing this has beendescribed with reference to FIG. 8. If a credit card number is found inthe transmission then it is assumed that a transaction must be occurringand control passes to step S258 at which the module exits. If no creditcard number is found then control passes instead to decision step S262where the transmission is scanned to see if it contains an account code.Account codes may be (for example) stored in a separate file which isaccessed by the module when performing this step or alternatively anaccount code may be identified from descriptive data in the transmissionsuch as a field name like “Account Number” or similar charactersappearing in the text of a message.

If in decision step S262 an account code is found, then it is assumedthat the transmission constitutes part of a transaction and controlpasses to step S258 where the module exits. If no account code is foundthen control passes to step S264 where, in the case of a web browser,the URL is compared with a list of known eCommerce URLs stored in a fileor in a database. In decision step S266, a determination on thatcomparison is made. If the URL is found to be at a known eCommerce page,or within a known set of eCommerce pages, then it is determined that aneCommerce transaction is taking place and control passes to step S258where the module exits. Similarly, in the case of an e-mail, thedestination address may be compared against a list of known eCommercee-mail addresses, for example “orders@abc.com,” and if a match is foundthen it is determined that an eCommerce transaction is taking place andcontrol passes to step S258 where the module exits.

The checks that have been described are only representative of thepossible checks that could be made to determine whether or not atransmission is likely to be part of an eCommerce transaction and arenot intended to be exhaustive. Furthermore, the order in which thechecks have been illustrated has no special significance. The order issimply dependent on the structure of the policy data as will be seenfrom reference to FIG. 13.

In step S268, a general check is illustrated which represents anyfurther check for an indication of a transaction, in addition to thosedescribed above, which a company decides it is desirable to employ, suchas searching for purchase codes or embedded codes placed in the data forexample. It is preferred that the web browser or e-mail client beingused in the preferred system allows the user to mark transmissions withan embedded code to indicate that the transmission is part of atransaction and should be recorded. Also, the embedded code could beplaced in the data by the web site or the e-mail client transmittingsome of the transaction data to the user's workstation.

Control passes to this step after step S266, if the site is notrecognized as a known eCommerce site and if such a transaction indicatoris found in step S268, then a transaction is deemed to be occurring andcontrol passes to step S258 where the module exits. If at step S268, nosuch indicator is found then no transaction is deemed to be occurringand the module exits at step S258. Following exit, the data may betransmitted, following points C and B in FIGS. 3 and 5 respectively, orbe processed following on from its receipt at point A in FIGS. 3 and 5.

In the example described, the aim is to start recording transmissionsand possible transaction details if there is just a suspicion that atransaction is occurring. It is assumed that recording data which is notpart of a transaction is preferable to not recording a transaction atall FIG. 13 is an illustration of the policy data used to identify thateCommerce transaction is occurring and to control the way in which thetransaction data is recorded. The policy data is represented by aTransactions branch of the policy data tree which sub-divides into twoseparate sub-branches called “Identification” and “Termination”. TheIdentification branch is itself divided into five sub-branches whichcorrespond to the determinations made in the process illustrated in FIG.12. The first of these sub-branches entitled “IfConnectionGoesSecure”allows a user to specify whether recording should start when the plug-inmodule detects that the connection to the web server has become secure.The conditions specified on the this sub-branch corresponds to decisionstep S252 shown in FIG. 12. It will be appreciated with reference toFIGS. 12 and 13 that the flow of control shown in FIG. 12 corresponds tothe layout of the conditions specified on the branches of the policydata tree shown in FIG. 13. The ExcludedSites branch of theIfConnectionGoesSecure branch contains a reference to table q in whichthe web sites known to negotiate secure sites but which are known not tobe eCommerce web sites are listed. Table q is referred to in step S256of the process shown in FIG. 12.

The next sub-branch of the identification branch is entitled“IfCreditCardNumberPresent” and allows the user to specify whether thedetection of a credit card number should or should not be used toinitiate recording of data being transmitted or received. Thissub-branch corresponds to decision step S260. The PreviousPagessub-branch of the IfCreditCardNumberPresent branch lists the number ofweb pages, prior to the web page in which the credit card number wasdetected, which should also be recorded. Since credit card numbers arenormally submitted at the end of the transaction, the provision of thissub-branch enables previous web pages which are likely to contain thedetails and request of the transaction to be retrieved and stored. Theseweb pages are cached continuously by the preferred system so that shoulda transaction be identified they may be retrieved from the cache andstored in the database. This will be explained in more detail withreference to FIG. 14.

The next sub-branch of the Identification branch tree is entitled“IfAccountsCodePresent” and allows a user to specify whether or not thedetection of an account code in the data being transmitted or receivedis to be taken as an indicator to initiate recording of the data. Theaccounts codes are identified in step S262 shown in FIG. 12 by referenceto table r. The reference to this table is contained in the AccountCodessub-branch of the IfAccountCodePresent branch. Note that this table alsoshows the number of previous pages to record, in a similar manner tothat described above for credit card identification, however in thiscase the number of previous pages to record is stored in table rallowing a different number of pages to be specified for each detectedaccount code.

The IfKnownECommerceSite branch allows the user to specify a list ofURLs corresponding to sites, parts of sites, or even single pages, whereeCommerce transactions are known to take place. The current page URL ismatched against entries in this list to determine if a transaction istaking place. The KnownSites sub-branch contains a reference to table sin which the URLs of known eCommerce sites are stored. The determinationof whether the URL of the web site is a known eCommerce site is made indecision step S266 following step S264 of FIG. 12. Lastly, theIfOtherIndicatorPresent branch provides a way for the user to specifywhether or not the determination of other indicators should be used as astarting point for the recording of data. Two sub-branches of thisbranch entitled KeyWords and PreviousPages specify possible indicatorsthat may be detected, in this case key words listed in table t, and alsothe number of previous pages that are required to be stored if key wordsare detected.

The Termination branch of the Transactions branch divides into foursub-branches which specify conditions which are used to end therecording of data being transmitted or received. Each sub-branch setsout a condition by which the end of the transaction may be defined. Thefirst branch entitled “IfConnectionGoesInsecure” allows a user tospecify that the relinquishing of a secure connection by the web browserindicates the end of a transaction so that recording should be stopped.The other sub-branches specify that when the web site changes recordingshould stop, if a digital receipt is received recording should stop andrecording should stop after the receipt of 20 web pages followingidentification that a transaction is occurring.

It must be stressed that policy data shown in this diagram, inparticular, but also in the other diagrams is unique to each user. Notonly may a user specify whether or not particular conditions are to beacted on by setting the Yes or No variable accordingly, or by changingthe number of pages that are to be recorded for example, but also thestructure and arrangement of branches and conditions specified on thosebranches may be different from user to user. It will be appreciated thatwhile the example policy describes recording of transactions in a webbrowser environment, a similar policy would control the e-mailenvironment, omitting the secure connection option, but allowing policyto be defined for recording e-mails on detection of credit card numbers,account codes or other identifiable information within them, or wheree-mails are sent to known eCommerce addresses.

The full benefit of the method for identifying a transaction is realizedwhen the method is utilized along with means for recording transmissionsbetween a user of the preferred system and a remote site. This allows arecord of all transactions carried out by a user to be kept andmaintained automatically. The records may be kept up to date without theneed for making paper copies of each transmission received or sent.Thus, a company's record keeping is made considerably easier and moreaccurate.

FIG. 14 illustrates the operation of a module for recordingtransmissions which comprise a transaction. The module is initiated atstep S270.

If the module is implemented as part of a web browser, step S270 isinitiated at point A in FIG. 3 after the receipt of data or after pointC in FIG. 3 directly before transmission data to remote site. If themodule is implemented as part of an e-mail client step S270 occurs afterpoint A in FIG. 5 after an e-mail has been received or after point B inFIG. 5 just before an e-mail composed by the user is sent to arecipient. Following step S270, control passes to step S272, in whichthe test for identifying a transaction, described above with referenceto FIG. 9, is performed and a determination is made as to whether aneCommerce transaction is occurring or not. Control then passes todecision step S274 where, if it is determined that no transaction isoccurring control passes directly to step S276 where the module exits.

If a transaction is determined to be occurring however control passes tostep S278 in which the policy is consulted against one or more of themeans of detection, the identity of the sender, the amount of thetransaction, or other parameters to determine which prior transmissions,if any, should be stored with the identified transmission, and in howmuch detail the transmission should be recorded. The policy might, forexample, require that a transaction involving a large sum of money berecorded in more detail than a transaction for a small sum. An exampleof this in operation might be the recording of every web page accessedduring the making of a transaction on an on-line trader's web site fortransactions involving large sums of money, but only recording thetransmission containing an electronic receipt for transactions forsmaller amounts.

As well as determining the amount of data to be stored, the policy filemay also determine the nature of the data to be recorded. The entiretransmission or web page may be recorded as a series of snap shots ofthe transaction, in the same way as web pages are stored in cachememories for example, or alternatively, individual items of data, suchas the date, the trader's identity, the amount and so on, may beextracted from the transmission or web page, and stored either on theirown or together with the snap shot data.

In this way, memory for storage can be used most effectively to ensurethat the most important transactions have sufficient space to berecorded. The amount of transaction data to be recorded may also dependon the trader's identity, geographical location, trading history withthe user's company, and the goods and services on offer.

In FIG. 13, the example policy data shows a simple scenario in which theamount of data to record is specified in terms of the number of webpages that are to be retrieved from the pages cached in memory. Thenumber differs depending on whether a credit card number, an accountcode or a keyword is identified. Furthermore, table r shows that withthe recognition of different account codes the number of previous webpages to store might be different, reflecting the relative importance ofthe account.

Extending this simple case to a more sophisticated one may be achievedby providing a higher level of detail in the policy data. Additionalbranches to the policy data tree could specify company or individualnames, or specific keywords relating to goods and/or services; theamount of data to record depending on these keywords and names as well.

Also, the tables might be expanded to refer to the amount of differenttypes of data that should be stored. Data such as the company name, whatwas being sold, the quantity and so on could be extracted from e-mailtext, from the HTML text defining the web page, or from the DOMrepresentation of the web page and stored in the database.

All web pages or information stored in the cache may be retrieved, oralternatively the system may retrieve only pages that have details incommon with the page initially identified as being part of atransaction.

Alternatively, a list of all stored messages may be presented to theuser for the user to manually select those transmissions which relate tothe identified transaction.

Following determination of how much data to record control passed todecision step S280. In step S280 if earlier transmissions, are to bestored, control passes to step S282 where the transmissions stored inthe local cache are retrieved. In the case of a web browser, this may bea determined number of prior pages, as described above. Where thetransaction was detected in a web browser, policy may also dictate thatthe cache is searched for prior e-mail messages relating to thetransaction, for example sent to or received from the same organization.This may be determined by matching portions of the browser URL toportions of the e-mail addresses. Similarly, transactions detected ine-mail messages may cause both prior e-mails and prior web pages to beretrieved from the cache. Control then passes to step S284 in which theidentified transaction and any retrieved prior transmissions are storedin the system database 42.

In step S280, if earlier transmissions are not required, control passesdirectly to step S284 where the transmission identified as a transactionis recorded in the system database. At the same time as thetransmissions are stored in step S284, related data such as the useridentity, the amount and the other party to the transaction may also berecorded in the system database to form a complete record, although thiswill depend on the instructions of the policy data. Control then passesto S286 and the module exits.

Following on from step S276 after the module exits, the data may betransmitted, following point A in FIGS. 3 and 5, or be processedfollowing on from being received at points C and B in FIGS. 3 and 5respectively.

Once a transmission has been identified as taking place all transmissionbetween the user and the other party may be recorded until the systemdetects that the transaction has been completed. Detecting the end pointof a transaction and stopping recording may be done in a manner similarto that described above for identifying whether a transaction is takingplace. The most simple implementation is to record transmissioninformation until an electronic receipt or shipping order is received.Alternatively, recording of transmissions may caused to stop after apre-determined number of transmissions between the user and the otherparty have occurred, or if a certain amount of time has passed since thetransaction was identified.

Transmissions may be made simpler if each time the user changes web sitethe cache is emptied. This keeps the memory required for the cachememory low, as well as reducing the number of previous transmissionsthat need to be searched if searching techniques are to be employed.

It will be appreciated that the methods described above can also be usedto record associated transmissions which occur after a transaction hasbeen detected and recorded. For example, a transaction made using a webbrowser will typically be followed by a confirmatory e-mail sent fromthe seller to the buyer. This e-mail can be detected as forming part ofthe transaction, since it will contain common characteristics, such asorder number, account number, goods description, price etc. It may alsobe sent from an address similar to the web site address, for example“customerservices abc.com” when the original web site used to make thepurchase was “abc.com.” A time element is preferably used such that onlysubsequent transmissions which occur within a given time period areconsidered as being associated with the original transaction.

The preferred system also provides means for monitoring transactionsthat are being made and automatically referring the transaction forapproval if that is deemed necessary. This process allows a largecompany to monitor and control the transactions being made by itsemployees using a single set of criteria set out in the policy data. Thepolicy data may be referred to each time a transaction is identified inorder to determine whether the user is authorized to make thattransaction himself or whether he needs to request authorization fromhigher up in the company. The process is illustrated in FIG. 15 to whichreference should now be made.

The module embodying this process is initiated at step S290. Thisinitiation preferably takes place as soon as all relevant details of thetransaction which need to be considered have been determined, and beforethe transaction is committed. In the case of an e-mail transaction,details such as goods and price are typically contained within a singlee-mail and can be considered prior to transmission of that e-mail. Inthe case of a web browser transaction, the existence of transaction maybe detected before all details are known, in which case initiation doesnot take place until they are. This does not normally present a problemas final commitment does not occur until the very end of the transactionprocess, well after all relevant details are known. Detection of thetransaction and relevant details may be determined in the mannerdescribed above with reference to FIG. 12. Referring briefly to FIGS. 3and 5, it will be seen that step S290 occurs after point C in FIG. 3 inthe case of web browser implementation, or after point A in FIG. 5 inthe case of e-mail client implementation once the required details areknown.

Control passes from step S290 to decision step S292 in which the detailsof the transaction are compared against the policy settings to determinewhether or not approval is required. The determination may be based onthe identity or the position of the employee making the transaction, theamount of the transaction, or the other party in the transaction. Insome instances, approval might always be required, such as if thefinancial director of a company wishes to review each transaction beforeit is made.

FIG. 16 is an illustration of example policy data that may be used todetermine whether or not a transaction requires approval from a thirdparty and also to determine the identity of an appropriate approver whois to be used. In this case, conditions in the policy data stipulatewhether approval is required depending on the transaction amount, andthe URL address of the other party to the transaction.

The relevant policy data is set out on the Transactions Approval branchof the policy data tree. This branch sub-divides into four sub-branches.The first branch is entitled “MaximumUnapprovedTransactionA-mount” anddefines a threshold amount for transactions. Transactions for amountsover the threshold must be approved by an approver before they are made.

The second sub-branch entitled “MaximumUnapprovedMonthlyAmount” definesa maximum amount for transactions that a user may make within a month.In this case, any transaction made by the user which would cause themonthly total to exceed $2,500 will require approval from a third party,as will further transactions made after that threshold has been reached.

The third branch entitled “ExcludedSites” refers to a table containingweb site and e-mail addresses of all sites which always require approvalfrom a third party before a transaction may be made. Finally, the lastbranch entitled “Approvers” refers to a table in which the names ofpossible third party approvers are listed. Along side each name is themaximum transaction amount for which that approver has the authority toapprove, and a list of excluded sites for which that approver may notapprove a transaction. In the simplest of cases, approvers will be othercomputer users logged in on the same network as the user making thetransaction such as department managers, or supervisors. The approverswill, by nature of their role, be members of the trading company whoassume and who have the authority to assume responsibility for thefinancial transactions the company makes. It is also possible thatapprovers might be drawn from a group of people who are employedprimarily for this role, such as people in the financial departmentonly.

If the conditions on the first three sub-branches of the transactionbranch indicate that approval is required an appropriate approver may befound by scanning through the table of approvers until an approver whosetransaction limit is equal to or greater than of the proposedtransaction and who is not prohibited from approving transactions to therelevant site is found.

It will be appreciated that the example policy data shown in FIG. 16 ispolicy data that is specific to a single computer user, or group ofusers, in the network. Other users, or groups, may have differentsettings and a different list of approvers.

It will be appreciated that the conditions to determine an appropriateapprover may be introduced by creating new sub-branches of the policydata tree.

The operation of the approvals process could for example be extended toany kind of transmission, not just those comprising an eCommercetransaction. Such operation may be implemented by having the conditionsdefined or the sub-branches of the policy data specify usernames,addresses or keywords for example that are to be identified in thetransmission and acted upon. Thus, all e-mail transmissions to aparticular company or individual may be caused to require approval, orall e-mails containing predetermined information recognized via keywordidentification.

If it is determined in step S292 that no approval is required, controlpasses directly to step S294 at which the module exits. Following stepS294 the transmission of the transaction is permitted and thetransaction may be proceed. Control returns from step S294 to point C inFIG. 3 or to point B in FIG. 5.

However, if in step S292, after consulting the policy settings, it isdetermined that approval of the transaction is required, control passesto step S296 in which the particulars of the transaction are used todetermine an appropriate approver for the transaction. The approver maybe a company employee logged on at his workstation, or at a workstationwith a dedicated approver function such as Operator consoles 44, asshown in FIG. 2, or may even be an automated process. In the case of alarge company with a number of departments, it maybe advantageous tohave a group of approvers for each department, each group monitoring thedepartment's accounts. This allows transactions to be rejected beforethey are made if, for example if the department head decides that hewishes to temporarily suspend purchases, or purchases of a particularnature.

Control passes from step S296 following determination of an appropriateapprover to step S298 where an approval request is transmitted to thedesignated approver via systems approval queue 100. Following step S298control passes to decision step S300 where it is determined if aresponse from the approver has been received. A timer is started themoment a request for approval is submitted. If a response has not beenreceived in step S300 control passes to step S302 where it is determinedfrom the timer whether or not a time out period has elapsed. Providingthe period has not elapsed, control passes from step S302 back to S300where the system continues to wait for a response from the approver.Thus decision steps S300 and S302 form a loop in which the system waitsuntil a response is received or until time out expires. In decision stepS300 once a response is received, control passes to step S304 in whichaction is taken depending upon whether the transaction was approved orrejected.

If the transaction was approved control passes from step S304 to stepS294 at which the module exits and the transmission is allowed toproceed. If however the transmission is not approved then control passesfrom step S300 to step S306 at which the module exits. Exiting at stepS306 however prevents the transmission of the transaction from takingplace and returns the user to point A in FIG. 3 in the case of webbrowser implementation or to step S132 “compose e-mail” in FIG. 5 in thecase of e-mail client implementation.

Also, if in step S302 the “time-out” is deemed to have expired without aresponse from the approver having been received then control passesdirectly to step S306 at which the module exits.

The right hand side of FIG. 15 shows the steps involved for theapprover. The approval process is initiated in step S310, from whichcontrol passes to step S312 in which the approver's machine queries thesystems approval queue for any new approval requests. Control thenpasses to decision step S314. In step S314 if no request is pendingcontrol passes back to step S312 where the system queue is polled onceagain. These steps are repeated until an approval request is received oruntil the approver deactivates the approval process.

In step S314 if an approval request is received, control passes to stepS316 in which the approval request is downloaded from the systems queueand the approver himself decides whether to approve the request orrefuse it. Control then passes to step S318 in which the approver'sresponse is transmitted back to the system approvals queue and fromthere back to the users work station.

Control passes from step S318 back to step S312 in which the systemapprovals queue is queried for new approval requests. It will beappreciated that the approvals process could be entirely automated insome circumstances. For example, transactions may be automaticallyrejected if the company does not have sufficient funds, if they wouldcause budget amounts to be exceeded, or if they are simply over amaximum amount. Such automation could alternatively be provided as partof the user process, such that an approvals request is not even made.

Security

The preferred system provides means to assign an appropriate securityrating to the transmission in dependence on the identified nature of thedata being transmitted. The security rating assigned may be set by theuser of the system using the policy data to reflect his needs.

The simplest implementation of the policy data in this case is a listcontaining in a first column possible types of data, such as employeepasswords, employer passwords, credit card numbers, banking details andso on, and containing in a second column, the desired encryptionstrength (in key bits for example) deemed appropriate for each datatype. It will be appreciated that other ways of assigning securitylevels in dependence on the determined nature of the data may also beemployed within the scope of the invention.

FIG. 17 shows an example illustration of policy data definingappropriate encryption strengths for various types of data. The policydata takes the form of a number of key-value pairs arranged on separatebranches of the policy data tree. The key specifies the type of datathat is being transmitted such as passwords, credit card numbers,submitted key words and a general key for any other submitted data. Thevalues that correspond to these keys are the encryption strength in bitsthat is deemed appropriate for the transmission of the data specified inthe key. The key value pairs are arranged on several branches of theRequiredEncryptionLevel branch of the TransmittedDataSecurity branch ofthe policy data tree. Thus, in the example, it may be seen thatpasswords have a desired encryption strength of 40 bits, company creditcard numbers and personal credit card numbers both have a desiredencryption strength of 128 bits, submitted key words have a desiredencryption strength of 40 bits and other submitted data requires noencryption.

The SubmittedKeywords branch refers to particular words or strings ortext that have been designated as sensitive and requiring some form ofencryption. These may be usernames, address information, financialinformation or pre-selected words such as “confidential” or “secret.”The submitted keywords may be detected by referring to a table or filein which they are stored.

Furthermore, each branch of the policy data may, instead of giving ageneral encryption strength, refer to a table in which differentpasswords or credit card numbers, for example, are listed along withcorresponding encryption strengths specific to each password or number.

Once a security rating has been assigned, the plug-in moduleinterrogates either the web browser to determine the security of thelink that has been established by the web browser with the web serverfor transmission of that information, or in the case of an e-mailtransmission, the encryption settings that the user or application havedetermined will be applied to the message. Typically, this will be thecryptographic strength of the encryption algorithm used to encode thedata for transmission. Such transmission details are received by the webbrowser as part of the “electronic handshake” from the web serviceprovider.

A secure link is usually indicated in a Browser window by the presenceof a closed padlock icon in the bottom right corner. A user can click onthe icon to interrogate the level of security that has been provided bythe handshake. In doing so they may receive a notification of the form“SSL secured (128 bit).” The first part of the notification describesthe type of the encryption used while the second part describes theencryption strength. The plug-in module is implemented to automaticallyobtain this data from the browser so that it may be used to determinewhether or not the security level is adequate for a proposedtransmission. Similarly, in the case of an e-mail message, the plug-inmodule determines the encryption settings that the user or applicationhas specified are to be used prior to transmission of the message.

The module compares the specified encryption strength with that of thelink or message and depending on the result of the comparison performsone of the following actions:

-   -   a) If the security of the link is appropriate for the nature of        the information being transmitted, the module allows the        information to be transmitted;    -   b) If the security of the link is more than that required for        the transmission of the information then, the module may either        allow the information to be transmitted at that level of        security, automatically renegotiate with the web server and the        web browser a new appropriate level of security and transmit the        information at that level, or prompt the user that the present        level of security is unnecessary and invite them to take action.    -   c) If the security of the link is not sufficient for the nature        of the information being transmitted then, the module may either        prevent the transmission from taking place and warn the user,        automatically renegotiate with the web server and the web        browser a new appropriate level of security and then transmit        the information at that level, or in the case of an e-mail        automatically increase the encryption strength setting, or        prompt the user that the present level of security is not        sufficient and invite them to confirm that they still wish for        transmission to take place.

It will be appreciated that the plug-in module could be configured torespond to a difference in the determined desirable level of securityand that being provided in a number of ways and that the actionsoutlined above are only illustrative.

Further actions that may be taken by the system might include requestinga different web page to be down loaded to the user's machine ormodifying the submitted field data such that sensitive information isnot transmitted.

The operation of a browser or e-mail plug in module for monitoring thedata being transmitted by a user of the preferred system is illustratedin FIG. 18, to which reference should be made. The module beginsoperation at step S320 at point C in FIG. 3, just prior to thetransmission of the data to a web server or at point B in FIG. 5 justprior to transmission of an e-mail. Control then passes to step S322, inwhich the module parses the data about to be transmitted and searchesfor credit card numbers. A possible method for doing this was describedearlier with reference to FIG. 8. If no credit card number is detectedin the data then control passes to step S314 in which the modulesearches for passwords in the data about to be transmitted. A method fordoing this has been described above, with reference to FIG. 6. If nopassword is found in the data, then control passes to step S316 in whichthe module searches for company account or purchase codes in the data.Recognizing account or purchase codes may be achieved by storing thecodes of the company in a file and attempting to match these codes withany strings of digits found in the outgoing data. If no account code isfound then control passes to step S318, where the module searches forindications of other sensitive data in the data to be transmitted. Suchindications will need to be defined in advance preferably in a separatefile used for detection, and will be dependent on the requirements ofthe users of the preferred system. Examples might be specified keywordsrelating to projects the company is undertaking, project titlesthemselves, personal details address of the recipient of the data, or ofthe sender, or even the word “confidential” or “private” included in thedata itself.

If no such indications are found that the data is sensitive and requiresstronger protection before it is transmitted, then the transmission isallowed to proceed at the current level of encryption. This may meanthat transmission takes place without any encryption being applied.

If however any of the checks in steps S322 to S328 reveal data that isdeemed sensitive then control passes to step S332 in which a securityrating is assigned to the detected data. This is achieved by comparingthe detected data with pre-determined entries in the policy data.

Each entry on the branch of the policy data has a pre-assigned level ofencryption which is the minimum level that may be used for transmissionof that data. The entries in the table and the assigned level ofencryption, as with all the policy settings, are decided by the companyusing the preferred system in dependence on their requirements.Assigning a security rating is then simply a matter of looking uppassword, credit card number or other data in the policy data andreading off the corresponding rating. References to tables on a subbranch of the policy data may be used to allocate different encryptionstrengths to different passwords, credit card numbers and so on.

Once the appropriate security level has been determined in step S332,control passes to step S334 in which the module determines the level ofencryption that has been negotiated with the web server to which thedata is being transmitted, or is to be used by the e-mail applicationprior to transmitting the message. This may be achieved by interrogatingthe web browser or e-mail application, or by setting encryption strengthvariables at the time the link is established or e-mail encryptionrequirements determined, both of which will occur prior to transmission.

Control then passes to decision step S336 in which the desired level ofsecurity, i.e. the encryption strength, is compared with that determinedin the previous step. If the desired level of encryption is lower thanor equal to that determined in step S334, then there is deemed to beenough protection for the data to be transmitted and control passes toend step S330, where the module exits. Following step S330, controlreturns to either point C in FIG. 3 or point B in FIG. 5 depending onwhether the module is implemented in a web browser or an e-mail client.Transmission of the data may then proceed in the usual way.

If however in step S336, the desired level of encryption is greater thanthat currently set, then the module does not allow transmission to goahead until the proper level of encryption has been negotiated. Controlpasses to decision step S338 in which the module determines if it isable to increase the encryption strength, and if so passes control tostep S340 where a new stronger encrypted link is negotiated, or in thecase of an e-mail a higher encryption strength set.

The highest level of encryption that is available depends on thesoftware being used by both the web server and the web browser, or inthe case of an e-mail by the sending and receiving e-mail applications.There may then be cases in which the appropriate level of encryption isnot available by one party and transmission of the data is never allowedto proceed. Furthermore, certain types of data may be given a securityrating that indicates that no level of encryption will ever be highenough to protect it, ie: preventing that data from ever beingtransmitted.

Having attempted to re-established the link, or changed the e-mailencryption settings, to a higher encryption strength, control passesback to step S334 to ensure the link or settings are now at a suitablestrength. If the appropriate encryption level cannot be renegotiated instep S338 or an attempt to increase the encryption strength at step S340has not been successful, then it is deemed unsafe to transmit the data,and control passes to end step S342 where the module exits. Followingexit at step S342, control returns to point A in FIG. 3, or to step S132in FIG. 5 “compose e-mail,” for the user to reconsider and edit or abortthe transmission. A suitable message may also be displayed to the userexplaining the reasons for the transmission being prevented.

The preferred system therefore provides a way of ensuring thattransmission of data is as secure as possible. It precludes thepossibility of a user forgetting to secure a transmission, andnegotiates a more appropriate level of security if that being used isnot sufficient.

Web Browsers may provide similar facilities to warn the user that userentered data is about to be sent over an insecure link or providefacilities to encrypt all messages by default. The preferred systemhowever provides the ability to examine the content of data to betransmitted to determine its security requirement, to allow or preventtransmission based on such security requirements, and on the determinedsecurity level of the link (encryption strength). It will be appreciatedthat the preferred system provides a significantly improved system forsecure transmission which reduces the possibility of human error.

Although the implementation of the preferred system has been describedwith reference to plug-in modules for existing applications, theinvention may be implemented by providing web browsers or e-mail clientsin which the functionality of the plug-in modules described here isalready coded from the outset.

1. An information management system comprising: one or more workstationsconnected to a computer network, each workstation having a memory; anapplication stored in said memory of each workstation for transmittingoutbound data to said computer network and receiving inbound data fromsaid computer network; policy data containing rules specifying anappropriate encryption strength for outbound data, the encryptionstrength depending on the content of the data; and an analyzer, saidanalyzer monitoring, in conjunction with said policy data, said outbounddata and determining, in accordance with said rules in said policy data,an appropriate encryption strength for the outbound data; wherein saidanalyzer controls transmission of said outbound data from saidapplication in dependence upon said determination of an appropriateencryption strength.
 2. The system of claim 1 wherein said rules in saidpolicy data define confidential data which can not be transmitted, saidanalyzer preventing, in conjunction with said policy data, saidconfidential data being transmitted from said application.
 3. The systemof claim 1 wherein said analyzer further determines the presentencryption strength in use for transmitting said outbound data; andwherein said analyzer controls transmission of said outbound data fromsaid application both in dependence upon said determination of anappropriate encryption strength and in dependence upon saiddetermination of the present encryption strength in use.
 4. The systemof claim 3 wherein if the analyzer determines that the presentencryption strength in use for transmitting outbound data is less thansaid appropriate encryption strength, then said analyzer preventstransmission of said outbound data from said application.
 5. The systemof claim 3 wherein if the analyzer determines that the presentencryption strength in use for transmitting outbound data is less thansaid appropriate encryption strength, then said analyzer preventstransmission of said outbound data from said application and controlssaid application to renegotiate an encryption strength for transmissionthat is appropriate.
 6. The system of claim 3 wherein if the analyzerdetermines that the present encryption strength in use for transmittingoutbound data is less than said appropriate encryption strength, thensaid analyzer modifies the outbound data such that the presentencryption strength is an appropriate encryption strength for thetransmission of the modified outbound data.
 7. The system of claim 3wherein if the analyzer determines that the present encryption strengthin use for transmitting outbound data is less than said appropriateencryption strength, then said analyzer controls said application tonotify a user of said application that the encryption strength in use isnot sufficient.
 8. The system of claim 1 wherein the analyzer furtheridentifies credit card numbers in said outbound data.
 9. The system ofclaim 8 wherein the analyzer further distinguishes a predetermined setof credit card numbers from other credit card numbers, wherein saidrules of said policy data define different appropriate encryptionstrengths for outbound data containing credit card numbers in thepredetermined set than for other credit card numbers.
 10. The system ofclaim 9 wherein said rules of said policy data specify that there is noappropriate encryption strength for a pre-determined set of one or morecredit card numbers.
 11. The system of claim 1 wherein said analyzerfurther identifies at least one or more of, credit card numbers, accountcodes, usernames, passwords, names and addresses and other predeterminedkeywords in the content of said outbound data.
 12. The system of claim 1wherein said rules in said policy data specify an appropriate encryptionstrength for said outbound data, that is dependent on the address towhich said outbound data is to be transmitted.
 13. The system of claim 1wherein said analyzer is located on each of said one or moreworkstations.
 14. The system of claim 1 wherein said application is aweb browser.
 15. The system of claim 14 wherein said analyzer is aplug-in module of said web browser.
 16. The system of claim 15 whereinsaid web browser is Microsoft's Internet Explorer and said analyzer is aBrowser Helper Object.
 17. The system of claim 1 wherein saidapplication is an e-mail client.
 18. The system of claim 17 wherein saidanalyzer is a plug-in module of said e-mail client.
 19. The system ofclaim 18 wherein said e-mail client is Microsoft's Outlook e-mail clientand said analyzer is a Microsoft client extension.
 20. The system ofclaim 1 wherein said computer network comprises a server and saidanalyzer is located at a point on said computer network intermediate tosaid one or more workstations and said server, or said analyzer islocated at said server.
 21. The system of claim 1 wherein said computernetwork to which said one or more workstations are connected is a publiccomputer network, and wherein said one or more workstations togetherform a private computer network.
 22. The system of claim 1 furthercomprising a supervisor workstation, said policy data being accessibleby said supervisor workstation, such that a user of said supervisorworkstation can edit said policy data.
 23. A method of managinginformation comprising the steps of: providing one or more workstationsconnected to a computer network, each workstation having a memory;providing an application stored in said memory of each workstation fortransmitting outbound data to said computer network and receivinginbound data from said computer network; providing policy datacontaining rules specifying an appropriate encryption strength foroutbound data, the encryption strength depending on the content of thedata; and analyzing said outbound data to determine, in accordance withsaid rules in said policy data, an appropriate encryption strength forthe outbound data; controlling transmission of said outbound data fromsaid application in dependence upon the determination of an appropriateencryption strength in said analyzing step.
 24. The method of claim 23wherein said rules in said policy data define confidential data whichcannot be transmitted, and wherein in said controlling step transmissionof said confidential data is prevented.
 25. The method of claim 23wherein said analyzing step further comprising the step of determiningthe present encryption strength in use for transmitting said outbounddata; and wherein in said controlling step the transmission of saidoutbound data from said application is dependent upon both thedetermination of an appropriate encryption strength and thedetermination of the present encryption strength in use.
 26. The methodof claim 25 wherein if it is determined that the present encryptionstrength in use for transmitting outbound data is less than saidappropriate encryption strength, then in said controlling steptransmission of said outbound data from said application is prevented.27. The method of claim 25 wherein if in said analyzing step it isdetermined that the present encryption strength in use for transmittingoutbound data is less than said appropriate encryption strength, then insaid controlling step an encryption strength appropriate fortransmission of said outbound data is negotiated before transmission.28. The method of claim 25 wherein if in said analyzing step it isdetermined that the present encryption strength in use for transmittingoutbound data is less than said appropriate encryption strength, then insaid controlling step the outbound data is modified such that thepresent encryption strength is an appropriate encryption strength. 29.The method of claim 25 wherein in said analyzing step if it isdetermined that the present encryption strength in use for transmittingoutbound data is less than said appropriate encryption strength, then insaid controlling step a user of said application is notified that theencryption strength in use is not sufficient.
 30. The method of claim 23wherein said analyzing step includes identifying credit card numbers insaid outbound data.
 31. The method of claim 30 wherein said analyzingstep includes distinguishing a pre-determined set of one or more creditcard numbers from other credit card numbers, and wherein said rules ofsaid policy data define a different appropriate encryption strength foroutbound data containing credit card numbers in that pre-determined setthan for other credit card numbers.
 32. The method of claim 31 whereinsaid rules of said policy data specifies that there is no appropriateencryption strength for said pre-determined set of one or more creditcard numbers.
 33. The method of claim 23 wherein said analyzing stepincludes identifying at least one or more of, credit card numbers,account codes, usernames, passwords, names and addresses and otherpredetermined keywords in the content of said outbound data.
 34. Themethod of claim 23 wherein said rules in said policy data specify anappropriate encryption strength for said outbound data, that isdependent on the address to which said outbound data is to betransmitted.
 35. The method of claim 23 wherein said analyzing step isperformed at said one or more workstations.
 36. The method of claim 2e3wherein said application is a web browser.
 37. The method of claim 36wherein said analyzing step is performed by a plug-in module of said webbrowser.
 38. The method of claim 37 wherein said web browser isMicrosoft's Internet Explorer and said plug-in module is a BrowserHelper Object.
 39. The method of claim 23 wherein said application is ane-mail client.
 40. The method of claim 39 wherein said analyzing step isperformed by a plug-in module of said e-mail client.
 41. The method ofclaim 40 wherein said e-mail client is Microsoft's Outlook e-mail clientand said plug-in module is a Microsoft Exchange client extension. 42.The method of claim 23 wherein said computer network comprises a serverand said analyzing step is performed at a point on said computer networkintermediate to said one or more workstations and said server, or saidanalyzing step is performed at said server.
 43. The method of claim 23wherein said computer network to which said one or more workstations areconnected is a public computer network, and wherein said one or moreworkstations together form a private computer network.
 44. The method ofclaim 23 further comprising the step of providing a supervisorworkstation, said policy data being accessible by said supervisorworkstation, such that a user of said supervisor workstation can editsaid policy data.
 45. An information management system comprising: oneor more workstations connected to a computer network, each workstationhaving a memory; application means, stored in said memory of eachworkstation, for transmitting outbound data to said computer network andreceiving inbound data from said computer network; policy storage means,for storing policy data containing rules specifying an appropriateencryption strength for outbound data, the encryption strength dependingon the content of the data; and analyzing means for monitoring, inconjunction with said policy data, said outbound data to determine, inaccordance with said rules in said policy data, an appropriateencryption strength for the outbound data; wherein said analyzing meanscontrols transmission of said outbound data from said application meansin dependence upon said determination of an appropriate encryptionstrength.
 46. The system of claim 45 wherein said rules in said policydata define confidential data which can not be transmitted, saidanalyzing means preventing, in conjunction with said policy data, saidconfidential data being transmitted from said application means.
 47. Thesystem of claim 45 wherein said analyzing means further determines thepresent encryption strength in use for transmitting said outbound data;and wherein said analyzing means controls transmission of said outbounddata from said application means both in dependence upon saiddetermination of an appropriate encryption strength and in dependenceupon said determination of the present encryption strength in use. 48.The system of claim 47 wherein if the analyzing means determines thatthe present encryption strength in use for transmitting outbound data isless than said appropriate encryption strength, then said analyzingmeans prevents transmission of said outbound data from said applicationmeans.
 49. The system of claim 47 wherein if the analyzing meansdetermines that the present encryption strength in use for transmittingoutbound data is less than said appropriate encryption strength, thensaid analyzing means prevents transmission of said outbound data fromsaid application means and controls said application to renegotiate anencryption strength for transmission that is appropriate.
 50. The systemof claim 47 wherein if the analyzing means determines that the presentencryption strength in use for transmitting outbound data is less thansaid appropriate encryption strength, then said analyzing means modifiesthe outbound data such that the present encryption strength is anappropriate encryption strength for the transmission of the modifiedoutbound data.
 51. The system of claim 47 wherein if the analyzing meansdetermines that the present encryption strength in use for transmittingoutbound data is less than said appropriate encryption strength, thensaid analyzing means controls said application means to notify a user ofsaid application means that the encryption strength in use is notsufficient.
 52. The system of claim 45 wherein the analyzing meansfurther identifies credit card numbers in said outbound data.
 53. Thesystem of claim 52 wherein the analyzing means further distinguishes apredetermined set of credit card numbers from other credit card numbers,wherein said rules of said policy data define different appropriateencryption strengths for outbound data containing credit card numbers inthe predetermined set than for other credit card numbers.
 54. The systemof claim 53 wherein said rules of said policy data specify that there isno appropriate encryption strength for a pre-determined set of one ormore credit card numbers.
 55. The system of claim 45 wherein saidanalyzing means further identifies at least one or more of, credit cardnumbers, account codes, usernames, passwords, names and addresses andother predetermined keywords in the content of said outbound data. 56.The system of claim 45 wherein said rules in said policy data specify anappropriate encryption strength for said outbound data, that isdependent on the address to which said outbound data is to betransmitted.
 57. The system of claim 45 wherein said analyzing means islocated on each of said one or more workstations.
 58. The system ofclaim 45 wherein said application means is a web browser.
 59. The systemof claim 58 wherein said analyzing means is a plug-in module of said webbrowser.
 60. The system of claim 59 wherein said web browser isMicrosoft's Internet Explorer and said analyzing means is a BrowserHelper Object.
 61. The system of claim 45 wherein said application meansis an e-mail client.
 62. The system of claim 61 wherein said analyzingmeans is a plug-in module of said e-mail client.
 63. The system of claim62 wherein said e-mail client is Microsoft's Outlook e-mail client andsaid analyzing means is a Microsoft client extension.
 64. The system ofclaim 45 wherein said computer network comprises a server and saidanalyzing means is located at a point on said computer networkintermediate to said one or more workstations and said server, or saidanalyzing means is located at said server.
 65. The system of claim 45wherein said computer network to which said one or more workstations areconnected is a public computer network, and wherein said one or moreworkstations together form a private computer network.
 66. The system ofclaim 45 further comprising a supervisor workstation, said policy databeing accessible by said supervisor workstation, such that a user ofsaid supervisor workstation can edit said policy data.